







Electrical & Computer Engineering
Presented in Partial Fullment of the Requirements for




c Shayan Eskandari, 2015
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
Division of Graduate Studies
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By : Shayan Eskandari
Entitled : Real-world Deployability and
Usability of Bitcoin
and submitted in partial fullment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Applied Science
complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards
with respect to originality and quality.
















We live in an era where Internet is one of the daily needs of human life. People
use Internet banking instead of going to banks, they use email rather than postal
mail.This leads to a robust digital way of living, but this also means people are
trusting middle companies and third parties for their online services. The need of
having a digital form of money that is not being controlled by one entity is plain to
see.
Bitcoin is the rst and the most popular decentralized virtual currency. It is based
on cryptographic functions to remove the need of a central bank and regulates the
generation of new units.
In this thesis, we would like to look at available tools to facilitate users in holding
and using Bitcoin by a perspective on usability and security, and then evaluate the
possibilities for a small business to accept Bitcoin payments. Our focus is on the
usability of these tools and developing a useful framework for comparing and eval-
uating future tools. While many security tools have been studied from a usability
perspective, our work is the rst to look at Bitcoin.
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We live in an era where Internet is one of the daily needs of human life and modern
countries. Instead of going to banks, people use Internet banking and instead of
sending a physical letter they use digital ways of communication. This leads to a
robust digital way of living, but this also means people are trusting middle companies
and third parties for their online services. The most important ones are banks and
nancial middle man (e.g., credit card companies) and there has been many downsides
to the trust, such as banks failing1, government collapses that leads to the country's
currency exchange rate decrease to pennies (e.g., Zimbabwean dollar [HK09] ) and
many more examples on smaller scale. The need of having a digital form of money
that is not being controlled by one entity is plain to see.
Bitcoin is the rst decentralized virtual currency and by far has the most number
1List of bank failures in the United States (2008present) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_bank_failures_in_the_United_States_(2008present)
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of users [Nak08]. It is based on cryptographic functions to remove the need of
a central bank and regulates the generation of new units. Bitcoin is still in its
early stages and there have not been that many practical applications of this digital
currency that could oer an ultimate solution for nancial problems.
In this thesis, we would like to look at available tools to facilitate users in holding
and using Bitcoin by a perspective on usability and security, and then evaluate the
possibilities for a small business to be able to accept Bitcoin payments. This could
be a summary for the usage of any kind of a currency, as there only should be two
entities involved in a monetary transaction, the payee and the payer.
Thesis Statement: End-to-end usable payment systems using Bitcoin, and its
components, can be designed for real-world deployability while maintaining a strong
notion of usability and security.
1.1 Background
The concept of digital cash was introduced by David Chaum in 1983 [Cha83], he
continued the idea and founded a company named DigiCash2 as a digital cash com-
pany. DigiCash led for bankruptcy in 1998 and sold its assets to eCash Technologies,




tems such as E-gold 4 followed, but due to unregulated use of E-gold, these companies
were shut down in 2005 by the federal government of the United States. In 2008,
Bitcoin was introduced to solve most of the problems of all the digital cash, which
marked the start of digital currencies.
Bitcoin was an innovation because it was not a new digital version of cash (eCash)
nor a commodity like gold (e-Gold), but it was its own currency with properties that
were not seen in any other currencies before.
Even though the idea of having a decentral money is interesting, to the best of
our knowledge, there has not been any published work on the usability of this new
form of money. Thus a framework to be able to evaluate applications in this eld
with usability perspective is needed.
For Bitcoin to ourish, adoption must expand beyond developers and tech-savvy
enthusiasts to novice users. Expansion solidies the need for a usable, comprehensible
approach to Bitcoin. If users cannot safely manage Bitcoin keys, it may result in the
users' loss of funds and/or a poor reputation for Bitcoin, both of which could dissuade
further user adoption.
1.2 Contributions
While this research is one of the rst usability research on the subject of Bitcoin, our
work provides a number of new contributions toward the evaluation of Bitcoin wallet
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-gold
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clients and payment systems, we summarize them here:
Bitcoin wallet comparison framework: We design a framework for comparing
Bitcoin wallet clients and evaluate the existing tools.
Bitcoin point of sale comparison framework: with the focus on the avail-
able tools for businesses to accept Bitcoin as a method of payment, we analyze a small
business's requirements using SCRAM [Sut03] a requirement engineering method
[Dor90] and evaluate all the available options for Bitcoin payments.
Fully customizable open-source Bitcoin point of sale5 : later we develop
a customized Bitcoin point of sale specic to a small business needs as none of the
available approaches could satisfy the needs. This software is available under GNU
General Public Licience v2 and has already been used in other small businesses to
accept Bitcoin.
Our focus in this thesis is on the usability of these tools and developing a useful
framework for comparing and evaluating future tools. While many security tools have
been studied from a usability perspective, our work is the rst to look at Bitcoin.
1.3 Organization
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we present some background on Bitcoin, the under-
lying protocol to the extent that it ts the scale of this thesis, and also some details




In Chapter 3, we use cognitive walkthrough to evaluate the usability of Bitcoin
wallet clients and then develop a framework for comparing existing and future wallet
clients. This work is the rst published usability paper on Bitcoin subject, mostly
focused on how these clients handle key management that is the fundamental require-
ment of any Bitcoin wallet client.
In Chapter 4, we survey all the available tools for small businesses to accept Bit-
coins and evaluate them based on the framework introduced in the same chapter.
Then using a requirement engineering method, we list all the advantages and dis-
advantages of using each method for a small business and later we develop a fully
customized open-source Bitcoin point of sale and implement it in real-world cafe6
to accept Bitcoins. To our knowledge, this is the rst cafe in Quebec, Canada that
accepts Bitcoin.
And in the end we evaluate our contributions and discuss the future work needed
in this eld to have a more usable and robust system for holding and accepting Bitcoin
as a method of payment.





Bitcoin or any other digital form of money by nature is an interesting idea for the
21st century, but how practical and useful these would be to the people living in this
era is what would make a dierence. In this research, we tried to have a real world
view of the implications that Bitcoin usage could have and also evaluated the existing
approaches to holding, using and accepting Bitcoin as a digital form of money.
2.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a cryptographic currency deployed in 2009 [Nak08], which has reached
a level of adoption unrealized by decades of previously proposed digital currencies
(from 1982 [Cha82] onward). Unlike many previous proposals, Bitcoin does not dis-
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tribute digital monetary units to users. Instead, a public ledger maintains a list of
every transaction1 made by all Bitcoin users since the creation of the currency. A
transaction in its simplest form describes the movement of some balance of the Bit-
coin currency (XBT or BTC) from one or more accounts (called input addresses)
into one or more accounts (called output addresses). Bitcoin addresses are indexed
by the ngerprint of a public key from a digital signature scheme.2 They are not
centrally allocated or registered in any way|the addresses become active when the
rst transaction moving money into them is added to the ledger.
In Bitcoin, every standard transaction3 must be digitally signed using the private
signing key associated with each input address in the transaction. In order to spend
Bitcoin, users require access to the signing key of the account holding their Bitcoin.
Thus users do not maintain any kind of units of currency; they maintain a set of keys
that provide them signing authority over certain accounts recorded in the ledger.
The ledger (known as the blockchain) is maintained and updated by a decen-
tralized network using a novel method to reach consensus that involves incentivizing
nodes in the network with the ability to generate (known as mining) new Bitcoin and
collect transaction fees. The details of the Bitcoin consensus model are not relevant
to this thesis, but we note that clients in the network participate in the consensus
model by downloading and cryptographically verifying the integrity of the blockchain.
1Technically, a transaction species a short script that encodes how the balance can be claimed
as the input to some future transaction.
2Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [Van92].
3From now on, the word transaction refers to a standard transaction unless otherwise specied
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As of writing, the Bitcoin blockchain is roughly 30 GB in size.
Due to the large size of the Bitcoin blockchain, full download is infeasible for thin
clients running on mobile devices, as well as some desktop clients. These clients con-
nect to a semi-trusted nodes and only request transactions relevant to keys in their
wallet. This technique, known as Simplied Payment Verication (SPV), eliminates
the need to download and verify the entire blockchain but, when implemented incor-
rectly, can create privacy risks [GKGC14]. Also it has integrity risks, in the sense
that it cannot forge transactions but could omit reports of relevant transactions.
In this section, we focus on introducing the essential constituents of Bitcoin that is
needed in this research. Some details have been simplied to prevent going outside the
scope of this thesis. Every aspect of Bitcoin that is missing from this introduction is
explained through this thesis when the preliminary information of the usage is known
to the reader.
2.2.1 Bitcoin Address
A Bitcoin address is a string of 26-35 alphanumeric characters that starts with "1" or
"3", that contains digits, uppercase and lowercase letters with the exception of "O",
"I" (Uppercase i) , "l" (Lower case L) and the number 0 to prevent visual ambiguity.
Bitcoin addresses are commonly shared via QR-Code as it is easier to read with
QR-code mobile scanners and is also implemented in most of the Bitcoin wallets as
the main method to exchange addresses (see gure 2.1 that is a representation of
the Bitcoin address 1shaYanre36PBhspFL9zG7nt6tfDhxQ4u). Bitcoin addresses are
8
Figure 2.1: QR-Code representing a Bitcoin address
derived from the equivalent ECDSA public key that will be explained shortly.
Public Key
In other words Bitcoin address is 160-bit hash of the public portion of the public
and private ECDSA keypair. A public key is derived from the private key by some
cryptographic functions (see Figure 2.2).
Private Key
A private key can be any 256 bit number from 0x1 to 0xFFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF
FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFE BAAE DCE6 AF48 A03B BFD2 5E8C D036 4140. Basi-
cally any number in this range would be valid as the input for secp256k14 ECDSA
standard. This is the secret part of the Bitcoin address that should be kept secure
and there are already dierent methods of securing the private key as discussed in
4Standards for Ecient Cryptography (SEC) https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1
9
Figure 2.2: ECDSA Public key to Bitcoin Address [Wik]
10
Chapter 3. Anyone with the private key has the ability to sign a transaction and
spend Bitcoins that are signed with the relevant public key (or Bitcoin address).
Same as the Bitcoin addresses and the public keys, private keys have a shorter for-
mat called wallet import format (wif) that is used commonly by most Bitcoin wallet
clients. It contains checksum bits and also some information about the public key
associated to the private key. An example of a private key in wif format would be
5Kb8kLf9zgWQnogidDA76MzPL6TsZZY36hWXMssSzNydYXYB9KF, which would
result in 1CC3X2gu58d6wXUWMpuzN9JAfTUWu4Kj as the associated Bitcoin ad-
dress.
To better understand how Bitcoin address is derived from the private key see
Figure 2.2.
BIP32
As Bitcoin creator, Satoshi Nakamoto [Nak08] also points out, it is better to generate
a new address for each transaction and receive the changes in a another new change
address (The concept of change addresses is explained more in chapter 3) to use the
pseudonymity of Bitcoin. This brought a challenge to Bitcoin wallet client designs.
Keeping track of all the addresses in the wallet le and also the ability to back up
the private keys, could get complicated when there are hundreds of keys in the wallet
(more in Chapter 3).
Since Bitcoin is an open source project, to make improvements to the proto-
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col, Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIP) are introduced by developers to be imple-
mented in the core code. One important proposal is BIP32 also known as Hierarchical
Deterministic Wallets or HD wallets [Pieb]. BIP32 introduces the ability to gener-
ate a tree of addresses from a single seed known as "Master Seed". A master node
would be generated from the master seed and it is possible to branch it to multiple
nodes shown as m/0, m/1, . . . , m/i , and then from each multiple addresses could
be derived such as m/0/1, m/0/2, etc.. Each of these derivation has a path in the
tree that is called "BIP32 Path", e.g., second branch of the rst branch of master
seed m is shown as "m/0/1". Commonly the rst branch would be used on dierent
accounts and the second depth of nodes on the tree would be used as the addresses
of each account. BIP32 simplies the backing up process as there is just a seed to
be backed up and it is easier to keep track of the addresses. It should be mentioned
that there are two parts to BIP32, the private key that starts with "xprv" and the
public part that starts with "xpub". BIP32 allows a simple terminal that does not
contain the private keys to generate new Bitcoin addresses (for use in point of sale
terminals) using the public portion of BIP32 seed. A visualization of how BIP32 was
designed can be seen in Figure 2.3.
2.2.2 Bitcoin Wallet
This term has been conated in Bitcoin sphere as both the le that contains the
private keys and also the software client used to mange Bitcoin transactions. This
concept is more discussed in Chapter 3. For the sake of simplicity, we use the term
12
Figure 2.3: BIP32 - Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets [Piea]
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Bitcoin wallet client as in the software used to sign and manage Bitcoin transactions,
and Bitcoin wallet le to the le containing the private keys. The rst and ocial
Bitcoin wallet client is Bitcoin Core (Bitcoind as the daemon) that will be explained
more on Chapter 3.
2.2.3 Conrmation
When a Bitcoin transaction broadcasts to the network, it should be included in a
block by Bitcoin miners. Bitcoin miners are the computational devices, which are
using their hashing power (computational power) to verify each and every transaction
within Bitcoin network and include them in a block. A block is a group of transactions
put together by a miner. Each block would be added to the blockchain with a hash
referencing its previous block and everyone in the network should form the consensus
that the hash value for the block and the previous one is correct. As soon as the
transaction is broadcasted it has 0-conrmation, meaning it has not been added to
any blocks yet. As soon as it gets included in a block it has 1 conrmation and this
increases by each block that gets added to the blockchain. The miner gets rewarded
by Bitcoin network for his work with 25 Bitcoins5.
It is possible for a miner6 to fork the blockchain and start to mine blocks on his
5Bitcoin generation algorithm rewards the miner based on a controlled supply algorithm https:
//en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply
6For the sake of simplicity of the language, in this thesis, we refer to the miners as "He", as in
the operator of the mining devices. A miner is a computational device that could be operated by a
single person or a group of people.
14
Figure 2.4: Bitcoin Blocks in the blockchain [Nak08]
own fork, here is when the consensus model is important as the coins that were mined
in his fork are invalid in the Bitcoin network and there is no reference in the main
blockchain that those coins exists. The consensus model dictates that if a node sees
two forks of the blockchain it should chose the longest chain. This check happens on
every new block that is added to the blockchain and seen by the node.
This is important to understand that it is possible for a 0-conrmation transaction
to stay unconrmed for a some time, depending on how much miner's fee is included
in the transaction and some other factors. Miner's tend to chose the transactions with
higher miner's fee to be included in the new block rst, but this is not a universal
fact. Thus the miner is in control to chose which transactions should be included in
the blocks he mines7.
7This is why 51% attack becomes noticable, as the miner that has 51% of the hashing power
would be in control to reject transactions specic to some addresses or whitelist some others to be
15
2.2.4 Double Spend
One of the major innovations of Bitcoin was to solve a problem known as "double
spending". For any digital data it is possible to duplicate the data and send it to
two dierent entities, this could be a problem when this digital data has monetary
value. Details of the solution would rely on a cryptographic description of how Bitcoin
protocol works. However to put it in simple words, when spending some Bitcoins as
an input to a transaction, the Bitcoin wallet should use the hash of those inputs
that are already in the blockchain, when it broadcasts that transaction it will be
stored on the memory of all the Bitcoin nodes as an unconrmed transaction8 until
it gets included in a block by a miner. In this period of time, it is possible to use the
same input in another transaction and broadcast it to the network, mainly because
that input was not spent in any blocks yet. Although only one of these transactions
could be included in a new block and the other one would be invalid and erased from
the memory. This makes it complicated for Bitcoin payment processors to accept
0-conrmation transactions as they could not be fully trusted.




A First Look at the Usability of
Bitcoin Key Management
This chapter is adapted from published work by Shayan Eskandari, super-
vised by Jeremy Clark and co-authored by David Barrera and Elizabeth
Stobert [EBSC15]
3.1 Introductory Remarks
In all of the excitement surrounding Bitcoin, it is easy to forget that the decen-
tralized currency assumes a solution to the longstanding problem of usable public
key cryptography for user authentication. Studies of the usability of key manage-
ment [GM05,GMS+05, SBKH06,GFFK06] have shown that there are numerous us-
ability issues that prevent public key cryptography from being eectively leveraged
17
by end users. Managing, controlling, and using cryptographic keys are complex tasks,
and no clear solution has been proposed.
Despite the known complexity in creating and managing cryptographic keys, the
Bitcoin network and software clients use such keys extensively for many operations.
For example, digital signatures, which require the Bitcoin software to read private
keys into memory, are used to assert ownership over a specic set of Bitcoins. Thus,
managing the same coins on multiple devices (e.g., a desktop and a phone) requires
the corresponding private keys to be copied to and made accessible on these devices.
The consequences of losing exclusive control over an account containing monetary
value connects the threat of losing a Bitcoin private key to that of losing an online
banking password. However, consumers in many countries are legally protected from
any liability of banking credential loss. Furthermore, most bank transactions are
traceable and reversible, making it dicult to extract value from stolen banking
credentials (most techniques involve a mule [FH12]). Bitcoin transactions are also
traceable, however they are not reversible. Stolen Bitcoins can thus not be centrally or
automatically recovered. Bitcoin users typically have no legal protection against loss
or theft, and while stolen Bitcoins could be traced as they change ownership,1 several
mechanisms exist for laundering Bitcoins and similar digital currencies [MGGR13,
BNM+14].
In an eort to address some of the complexities of key management, developers
1Public keys associated with specic Bitcoins are publicly available in the Bitcoin blockchain,
but the identities of users who control those keys are not.
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of Bitcoin software have created a variety of innovative technologies ranging from
password-derived keys to air-gapped computers to physical printouts of private keys in
the form of 2D barcodes. However, since none of these proposals have been evaluated
in the Bitcoin context, it remains unclear which techniques have usability advantages.
For Bitcoin to ourish, adoption must expand beyond developers and tech-savvy
enthusiasts to novice users. Expansion solidies the need for a usable, comprehensible
approach to Bitcoin. If users cannot safely manage Bitcoin keys, it may result in the
users' loss of funds and/or a poor reputation for Bitcoin, both of which could dissuade
further user adoption.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the usability challenges surrounding key man-
agement in Bitcoin. To do this, we survey and categorize the most prominent Bitcoin
key management proposals. Next we conduct an expert usability inspection technique
known as a cognitive walkthrough [WRLP94] on popular examples of each proposal.
Our goal is to identify overarching usability issues as well as advantages of specic
proposals, allowing us to propose design recommendations for future Bitcoin clients.
Specically, the contributions of the paper are as follows:
 We perform a broad survey of six Bitcoin key management techniques which
cover the vast majority of deployed Bitcoin software.
 Using the results from our survey, we propose an evaluation and comparison
framework for Bitcoin key management techniques. The framework is based on
10 security, usability and deployability criteria, and enables direct comparison
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of current and future key management proposals. Using our framework we
nd that certain properties, such as trust in a central party enable additional
benecial properties. We also nd that the disadvantages of certain properties,
such as malware protection, outweigh the relative benets.
 We perform a cognitive walkthrough of six distinct Bitcoin clients and tools
to identify usability issues while performing basic Bitcoin tasks (e.g., viewing
account balance, sending funds, etc.). We nd that the metaphors and abstrac-
tions used in the surveyed clients are subject to misinterpretations, and that
the clients do not do enough to support their users.
This chapter is a longer version of the published paper [EBSC15].
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Bitcoin
One subtlety of Bitcoin's transaction architecture is that, in order to spend Bitcoins,
the entire value of unspent outputs (i.e., from previous transactions) must be spent.
To accommodate this, Bitcoin clients automatically spend the full amount of unspent
outputs and create multiple components in the transaction: one component will send
part of the unspent coins to the intended recipient, and the other component will
send the remaining inputs back to the sender as change. It is technically possible
(and some clients behave this way) to send change back to the sending address.
20
However, to enhance anonymity, the reference client generates fresh addresses (and
corresponding private keys) to receive the remaining transaction amount.
As more transactions are made, Bitcoin clients must keep track of multiple private
keys for use in future transactions. Many clients prominently display a Bitcoin bal-
ance on the main screen, which represents the sum of all unspent outputs for which
private keys are available.
One subtlety of Bitcoin transactions is that each XBT amount in the set of inputs
must reference past transactions where the address received adequate XBT to cover
the input amount. The complexity here is that a transaction must completely spend
the amount received in these past transactions even if it is larger than the amount
in the current transaction. To enable this, transactions will output the surplus XBT
back to the sender as `change.' Change can be sent back to the same input address,
or to enhance privacy, it can be sent to a brand new address created by the sender's
client (called `change addresses').
3.2.2 Usability of Key Management
Passwords remain the most common form of user authentication [HvO12]. Private
key-based authentication is rarely used by non-experts, and is typically never used as
the default conguration in applications which support this authentication method.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) client-side certicates have failed to reached wide-
spread deployment. Secure shell (SSH) uses passwords by default, and recent eorts
to reintegrate them in a dierent form (e.g., origin-bound certicates [DCBW12])
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still rely on passwords as the primary authentication mechanism.
Password managers, when congured to generate or store system-chosen random
passwords, share at least one property of cryptographic keys: such passwords become
something you have instead of know. However, if access to such a password is lost,
online services generally oer account recovery mechanisms (e.g., based on email).
No such recovery mechanism exists for self-managed cryptographic keys.
The use of public key systems by non-experts that is closest to Bitcoin is arguably
encrypted/authenticated email, in particular Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and its
open-source alternatives (i.e., GPG and OpenPGP). Beginning with Why Johnny
Can't Encrypt [WT99], the usability of public key technology has been well-studied
from a usability perspective [GM05, GMS+05, SBKH06, GFFK06]. The ndings of
this literature are diverse but relevant observations include the following: (1) the
metaphor and terminology behind public and private keys is confusing; (2) it is
dicult to correctly obtain other users' public keys; (3) key migration between devices
is dicult. This literature tends to focus primarily on encryption and not signatures,
but we nd some overlap to the work presented here 2.
3.3 Bitcoin Key Management Approaches
Before turning to a detailed usability evaluation, we evaluate from a systems perspec-
tive each category of tool for managing Bitcoin private keys. We highlight security
2\Why King George III can encrypt," Freedom to Tinker (blog), 6/6/2014.
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and deployability issues, and note relevant details of the Bitcoin protocol that create
complexities and potential discrepancies with users' mental models.
3.3.1 Keys in Local Storage
One way in which Bitcoin software manages several private keys is by storing these
keys on the device's local storage, typically in a le or database in a pre-congured
le system path. When a new transaction is created, the Bitcoin client can read
the keys and immediately (possibly without any further user input) broadcast the
transaction over the network. The reference Bitcoin client (Bitcoin Core), as well
as certain mobile wallets (e.g., Android Bitcoin Wallet) use this approach, storing
private keys in a le (referred to as a wallet) inside the user's home or application
directory.
Storing keys in a locally accessible le has several advantages. First, there is
no additional cognitive load on users, since only the software must access the le.
Second, a practically unlimited number of keys can be stored on disk due to the
small size of keys. Third, the Bitcoin software can automatically generate keys and
create transactions without additional input or actions from the user.
Storing keys locally also creates several threats, which the user must consider.
For example, the le storing private keys can be read by any application with access
to the user's application folder. Malware authors may be particularly interested in
exploiting this key management approach, since access to the local le results in the
adversary gaining immediate access to the victim's funds. One of the rst examples of
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private key-stealing malware was discovered by Symantec in 2011 [Sym], with many
other similar malware examples following suit.
Users must be cautious to not inadvertently share their Bitcoin application folder
(e.g., through peer-to-peer le sharing networks, o-site backups or on a shared
network drive). Physical theft, especially in the case of portable computers or smart-
phones must also be considered. Similar to the storage of other sensitive les, threats
to digital preservation [BKM05] should be taken into account. Examples include
general equipment failure due to natural disasters and electrical failures; acts of war;
mistaken erasure (e.g., formatting the wrong drive or deleting the wrong folder); bit
rot (i.e., undetected storage failure); and possibly others. If storing private keys for a
long period of time (e.g., a trust fund or long-term savings), users must also preserve
a specication of the le format to ensure the keys can continue to be read.
The reference Bitcoin client pre-generates keys in a batch of 100 (these keys are
known as the keypool). When a transaction is made, the next available key is selected
from the keypool for receiving change. The keypool is then periodically relled with
a new batch of keys as necessary. This key churn requires users to periodically create
new backups of their key storage le to ensure that new keypool keys are stored.
The user must also be wary of key churn as the Bitcoin Core client sends change
to new addresses. By default, it creates private keys in batches of 100 (called a
keypool). This has the unfortunate side-eect that backups become obsolete after
the user churns through their current keypool. The user interface of Bitcoin Core
does not display change addresses or give any indication that they are being used,
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and so it is quite natural that a novice users' mental model will not account for this
behaviour, and they will not act accordingly to ensure they re-backup wallet.dat
each time they deplete the keypool (another event that is not communicated to the
user in any way). To address key churn, alternative Bitcoin clients return all change
to the same address or derive all change addresses, called a deterministic wallet, from
a single key.
Another disadvantage of using Bitcoin Core is that it requires a copy of the entire
blockchain to validate the balance associated with each of the keys it will create.
At the time of writing, the blockchain is 35 GB.3 For a new installation, it is not
uncommon for it to take days to obtain a local copy of blockchain from the Bitcoin
peer-to-peer network.
3.3.2 Password-protected (Encrypted) Wallets
Certain Bitcoin clients allow a locally stored wallet le to be encrypted with a key de-
rived from a user-chosen password or passphrase. Password-protected wallets appear
to address only physical theft of the underlying storage device, requiring brute-force
of the password if the le containing private keys is stolen. Password protection seems
less useful in the case of digital theft; if malware can be installed on to the device
storing the wallet, it is reasonable to assume a keystroke-logging module would be
present, limiting or nullifying the benets of the password protection.
Password-protected wallets share the advantages and disadvantages of non-encrypted
3https://blockchain.info/charts/blocks-size
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wallets (see Section 3.3.1), with a few subtle dierences. Password-protected wallets
trade recoverability and usability for the mitigation of physical theft. If the pass-
word is forgotten, users lose the balance of their password-protected wallet since no
mechanism exists for recovery4. For day-to-day use, users must unlock the wallet by
entering their password when new transactions are made.
The trade-o of a password-protected wallet is that users can lose their XBT by
forgetting the password protecting their wallet. No recovery mechanism exists (as
this mechanism could itself be exploited in the case of theft) short of exhaustive
search, which is an available service.5
Password-protected wallets may mislead the user to believe that the password
itself provides access to their funds regardless of the location of the device storing the
wallet, as would be congruent with a traditional mental model for web-based online
banking. Users may be surprised to discover that they cannot access their funds at
a new device by simply entering their encryption password; the wallet le must also
be transferred to the new device.
3.3.3 Oine Storage of Keys
To further protect Bitcoin private keys from malware-based threats, wallets can be
stored oine on some form of portable media, such as a USB thumbdrive. Keeping




keys oine enables the use of traditional physical security techniques (e.g., storing
the drive in a re-proof safe) to protect the wallet. However, oine storage has the
drawback of making the wallet inaccessible for immediate use by software, preventing
users from spending funds unless the oine storage media is nearby. As expected,
oine storage can be used for backup, but all copies of the wallet must be kept
oine for the full benets of theft-protection to be realized. Prior to oine storage
(wallet creation) and after storage (future transactions), the wallet will be exposed
on a computational device, potentially to malware.
Figure 3.1: Oine storage - Paper Wallet
An interesting case of oine key storage is paper wallets (see 3.1) where private
keys are printed onto paper typically in the form of a 2D barcode (e.g., a QR code) or
as a long sequence of characters. Barcodes facilitate reading the key back into a Bit-
coin client by, for example, scanning the code with a smartphone camera. Securing a
paper wallet is similar to securing cash, which most users should be comfortable with.
However, funds can be stolen from a paper wallet by simply observing the QR code
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(e.g., on live television6), which is not possible with physical money. Thus transport-
ing a paper wallet securely requires that the printed contents remain unobservable
at all times. Users must remember that a paper wallet does not contain the funds
itself, but rather enables signing authority over a set of Bitcoins. For example, if a
paper wallet is discarded after funds are spent, the paper wallet still provides access
to any future funds that may be sent to that address.7
Finally, users still need to be cautious of key churn and that spending XBT from
a paper wallet does not result in XBT being sent to a change address not included
in the paper wallet.
As with any long-term storage, users must preserve software capable of decoding
the QR code in the event that the paper wallet generation service is unavailable
when attempting to reload keys onto a device. As of writing, many Bitcoin clients as
well as oine storage solution use a common \wallet import format", which involves
manipulating an ECDSA private key by performing cryptographic hashes, adding a
checksum for integrity, and encoding the resulting string into Base58.8
6\A Bloomberg TV Host Gifted Bitcoin On Air And It Immediately Got Stolen," Business
Insider, 10/23/2013.
7\Five Ways to Lose Money with Bitcoin Change Addresses," Bitzuma (Blog), 17/03/2014.
8Base58 avoids the use of characters such as \0, O, I, and l" which may look visually similar,
and also avoids punctuation characters which may trigger software (e.g., e-mail clients) to perform
line breaks.
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3.3.4 Air-gapped Key Storage
In oine storage, we assume the device or media holding private keys cannot perform
computations such as creating digital signatures. We distinguish this type of storage
from air-gapped storage, where wallets are stored on a secondary device that gener-
ates, signs, and exports transactions, but this secondary device is never connected
to a network. When spending Bitcoins using an air-gapped device, a transaction
is created from the air-gapped device and the resulting signed output transported
(usually through portable media) to an Internet-enabled device for transmission onto
the Bitcoin network.
An air gap improves theft-resistance by never directly using a private key on an
Internet-connected device. However, air gapped devices are capable of actually exe-
cuting malware if infected. Malware may jump the air gap by infecting the portable
media used to export signed transactions.
While not literally an air gap, hardware security modules (HSMs) emulate the
properties of an air gap by isolating the key material from the host device, and only
exposing the ability to sign transactions. Bitcoin-specic HSMs are under active
development at the time of writing and a few have been recently released (e.g.,
Trezor9).
Note that the consequences of obtaining access to the private keys are not much
dierent from accessing a transaction-signing oracle for the wallet|both allow the
current balance of Bitcoin to be stolen. However, future funds may be protected if
9http://www.Bitcointrezor.com
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access to the signing oracle is non-persistent.
3.3.5 Password-derived Keys
Thus far, all key management solutions have required users to maintain cryptographic
keys. The remaining two solutions enable users to access their Bitcoin with a password
instead.
The rst approach is to derive cryptographic keys from a user-chosen password
(e.g., using PBKDF2 [RSA], manipulating the output to produce a valid Bitcoin
private key). The disadvantage of using this approach directly is that only one
resulting keypair is created, requiring the user to select a new (dierent) password
for a new keypair.
A more robust approach is described in the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 32 [Pieb],
and is known as a Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) Wallet. HD wallets deterministi-
cally derive a set of private keys from a master secret (a randomly chosen passphrase).
These keys can derive new private keys. The deterministic nature allows the pass-
word holder to view the balance, as well as spend the funds, of any sub-account
derived from the password. However, if the private key on one of the sub-accounts is
compromised, only the funds sent to that sub-key (or sub-keys derived from it) may
be stolen.
Password-derived wallets are targeted at loss-prevention and simpler cross-device
access. The challenges of preserving access to a digital le are no longer necessary
as long as the wallet can be re-generated from a memorized password. The pri-
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mary drawback of a password-derived wallet is that weak user-chosen passwords can
be found through unthrottled exhaustive search since a ngerprint of the associated
public key will be in the global public ledger if the account holds any amount of
Bitcoin. Rainbow tables [Oec03] for password-derived keys have been developed.10
Finally, it remains unclear whether memorization poses an advantage over maintain-
ing a digital le when preventing loss|a forgotten password will orphan all funds in
the account.
3.3.6 Hosted Wallets
A nal approach to key management is to host user accounts on a third-party web
service. In this case, the service maintains possession of the private keys. Hosted wal-
let web services provide the user with access to transactional functionalities through
standard web authentication mechanisms, such as a password or two-factor authen-
tication, and may also oer password recovery mechanisms. Bitcoin smartphone
applications that act as clients to hosted wallets benet from reduced application
complexity (i.e., no need to perform cryptographic operations on the device) and
brick and mortar bank-like user interfaces. Currency exchange services that allow
Bitcoin to be exchanged with at currency eectively provide this service, as do web
services deployed specically to host wallets.
The popularity of hosted wallets appears to be justied, since these services pro-
10D. Martyn. \Bitcoin `Brainwallets' and why they are a bad idea," Insecurety Research (sic)
(Blog), 26 Mar 2013.
31
vide the closest experience to traditional online banking. However, their use has also
been hampered by high prole breaches and fraud. Users' funds have been unrecov-
ered from services such as Mt.Gox and Bitcoinica, while popular exchanges such as
BTC-E have suered losses but fully reimbursed users. Thefts and losses from/by
third party services are catalogued online11 and include over 40 events involving losses
greater than 1000 XBT.12
It is natural to expect hosted wallet services will become primary targets of attack
since these services typically hold large amounts of Bitcoin. Ooading the task of
key management to a third-party requires users to assume the risk that the service
could be breached and funds lost, in exchange for a traditional online banking-style
user experience.
As a counter-measure to theft, hosted wallet providers often keep only a small oat
of their holdings online (called hot storage) and store the majority of their holdings
oine in cold storage. This has the drawback of causing delays in transactions for
users if the hot storage amount is exhausted. Hosted wallet services may also allow
audits, where they cryptographically prove possession of sucient Bitcoin to match
their liabilities.
Another approach that falls under the hosted wallet category is a hybrid hosted
wallet. Hybrid wallets use client side encryption (typically in Javascript) to encrypt
all private keys and sensitive data. The web service is then only used for broadcasting
11https://Bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=576337.0
12At the time of writing, 1000 XBT > 650 000 USD.
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transactions to the network and for displaying the user's balance (which requires
inspecting the entire blockchain).
Other than server side encryption and security measures, It uses client side en-
cryption (javascript) to encrypt all the private keys and sensitive data with user's
password and sends the encrypted data as a random base64 string to the server.
With this implementation, there is no access to the private keys and the nal bal-
ance from anyone whom have access to the server's data 13. Blockchain.info uses this
implementation for its hosted wallet.
3.4 Evaluation Framework
In this section, we systematize the major category-wide issues we have uncovered
in describing the various key management approaches used by Bitcoin clients. We
present an evaluation framework based on 10 criteria as shown in Table 3.1 and dis-
cussed in the following subsections. This framework both summarizes the advantages
and disadvantages of the various approaches we have evaluated, while also provid-
ing a benchmark for evaluating future key management proposals. The framework is





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We briey enumerate the criteria used to evaluate each proposal in the framework
below.
Malware Resistant. Malware designed to steal Bitcoin wallets and related pass-
words has been observed in the wild. Wallets that are not stored on an Internet-
connected device, or devices capable of performing computations are considered mal-
ware resistant (), unless creating a transaction involves transferring to a computa-
tional device ().
Key Stored Oine. For archival storage of infrequently used keys, keys not directly
accessible from an Internet-connected device|either due to being oine () or online
but password-protected ()|are preferable.
No Trusted Third Party. All Bitcoin key management tools are trusted to a
certain extent. This criteria considers the absence of a persistent trusted third party
() that maintains direct signing authority over a user's Bitcoin.
Resistant to Physical Theft. If the cryptographic keys are stored on some media
or device that can be physically stolen, we do not consider the tool to be resistant to
physical theft. Within our framework, the only tools meeting this requirement rely on
a human memorized password being necessary for key recovery. These are awarded ()
since passwords tend to be weak and may not adequately resist unthrottled guessing.
Resistant to Physical Observation. Physical observation, such as observing key
strokes or capturing QR codes with a camera, may result in access to a user's Bitcoin
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account.
Resilient to Password Loss. If passwords are used (), the loss of a password could
result in some Bitcoin becoming unrecoverable if it is a necessary authentication factor
in obtaining access to the signing key. For solutions where funds are held by third
parties, these entities could provide a password recovery/reset mechanism ().
Resilient to Key Churn. Assuming the client sends change from transactions to
a newly created change addresses, a tool is resilient to key churn if it can maintain
access to the funds even after exhausting the initial keypool (). Tools not awarded
this benet are not guaranteed to maintain persistent access to new change addresses,
and any balance sent to these addresses may be lost.
Immediate Access. Key management mechanisms that maintain direct access to
the wallet enable Bitcoin to be transacted immediately (). We award this benet to
techniques that require a user to enter a password. We omit the benet for techniques
that require data to be obtained from external storage medium or secondary device.
No New User Software. Some approaches require users to install new software
on their system, for which the user may not have suitable permission, or software
may not be developed for their specic platform (e.g., some mobile platforms). By
contrast, some tools can be executed from widely available software such as any
standards-compliant web browser ().
Cross-Device Portability. A key management technique is cross-device portable
() if it allows easy sharing of the a Bitcoin address across multiple devices with
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minimal conguration or usability issues due to complexities like key churn.
3.4.2 Discussion
Table 3.1 demonstrates that key management approaches provide varying levels of
security and convenience, with no single approach being obviously superior to others.
One possible takeaway from our evaluation and comparison is that users can benet
heavily by ooading key management to a trusted party (e.g., hosted wallets). The
lower right side of the chart focuses on usability properties that are already present in
traditional nancial services (i.e., resilient to password loss, no new software, cross-
device portability). These properties are dicult to obtain if users independently
manage their keys through one of the local storage techniques. Of course, the disad-
vantage of trusting a third party is that Bitcoin funds are now bound by a contractual
agreement between users and the hosted wallet provider, negating one of the primary
features of Bitcoin: a fully decentralized currency. Users in countries lacking regu-
latory maturity for digital currencies should exercise caution when trusting a third
party with large amounts of Bitcoin.
Based on our analysis, users can be given the concrete advice of treating digital
currency much like they would treat at currency: keeping small amounts in ready-to-
spend form (e.g., local storage or online hosted walled) mimicking cash, and keeping
larger sums in more dicult to access but more secure storage (e.g., air-gapped or
oine storage) mimicking a savings account or trust fund. Barber et al. [BBSU12]
suggest the use of \super wallets" where users essentially run their own personal bank.
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A super-wallet keeps keys across multiple devices and requires all (or a subset using
a threshold scheme) to be present to transfer funds to sub-wallets. Pre-congured
transfers of small amounts can be authorized to move funds to sub-wallets that can
be used for day-to-day spending. While the idea of super-wallets is intuitive, the
implementation of such a scheme could introduce high levels of complexity.
3.5 Usability Evaluation of Bitcoin Clients
3.5.1 Methodology
We used a series of cognitive walkthroughs [WRLP94] to evaluate the usability of six
Bitcoin clients. Cognitive walkthrough is a form of expert evaluation where an expert
(or group of experts) steps through the design to evaluate aspects of its usability. The
focus of the walkthrough is on the novice user and emphasizes learnability which is
dened in ISO/IEC 25010 as the \degree to which a product or system can be used
by specied users to achieve specied goals of learning to use the product or system
with eectiveness, eciency, freedom from risk and satisfaction in a specied context
of use\ [SQu]. At each step, the evaluators ask three questions: Will the user see
what to do? Will the user see how to do it? And once it is done, will the user know
if they have performed the correct action? If the answer to any of these is no, the
evaluator will record the violation. When using multiple evaluators, the aggregated
result will be the union of violations found by each evaluator.
We chose to use cognitive walkthroughs for several reasons. First, it allowed us to
38
choose and compare standard tasks on disparate tools, and gave us easily compared
insight into the common problems and successes of dierent Bitcoin clients. The
cognitive walkthrough also allowed us to keep the focus on the novice user. The goal
of our evaluation was to uncover problems specic to key management within Bitcoin
software rather than to evaluate the usability of the clients themselves.
A number of usability evaluation methodologies employ expert review. We use a
cognitive walkthrough [WRLP94], which has been used previously to study closely-
related subjects: public key technology [WT99] and software conguration [CvOA07].
A cognitive walkthrough is premised on the idea that users learn through exploration
of the software, instead of reading manuals. They attempt to perform the task they
want completed and rely on the interface to intuitively guide them through proper
design, interface cues, and feedback.
For our cognitive walkthrough, we dened a set of core tasks involving key man-
agement that a typical user needs to perform. We compared the results of each
walkthrough against a standard set of evaluation guidelines, combining aspects of an
heuristic evaluation [Nie92] with the walkthrough in order to interpret our results.
Each of the following four tasks was independently performed by 2 experts to
evaluate each tool:
T1 Congure a new Bitcoin address and obtain its balance. This task involves
launching the Bitcoin client (or logging into one if hosted online) for the rst
time. After a new address has been generated (either explicitly or transparently
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in the background), the user should be condent that the address' balance is
XBT 0.00000000. The user should also be able to nd their receiving Bitcoin
address.
T2 Spend Bitcoin. Send some amount of Bitcoin to an arbitrary (but valid) Bit-
coin address. This task requires the user to create a new transaction, entering
relevant information such as recipient, amount, etc.
T3 Spend Bitcoin from the same address as above, but on a secondary device.
This task may require copying private keys to the secondary device, entering
passwords on multiple devices, or logging in to a hosted wallet provider on a
dierent browser.
T4 Recover from the loss of the main credential. In the case of locally stored keys,
this task involves restoring a le from backup. Otherwise this task involves
recovering from password loss.
Since the focus of our walkthrough was on conguration and learnability, we used
a set of heuristics rst developed for a usability evaluation of Tor [CvOA07]. We chose
to use these guidelines because like the anonymity software, successfully managing
Bitcoin involves the application of complex cryptographic knowledge in an everyday
activity. The set of guidelines, from [CvOA07], are:
G1 Users should be aware of the steps they have to perform to complete a core
task.
G2 Users should be able to determine how to perform these steps.
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G3 Users should know when they have successfully completed a core task.
G4 Users should be able to recognize, diagnose, and recover from non-critical errors.
G5 Users should not make dangerous errors from which they cannot recover.
G6 Users should be comfortable with the terminology used in any interface dia-
logues or documentation.
G7 Users should be suciently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.
G8 Users should be aware of the application's status at all times.
Cognitive walkthroughs are primarily relied on when the breadth of the evaluation
makes a user or eld study prohibitive to run due to time and cost. We examine six
Bitcoin key managers, from conguration through transaction authorization through
key recovery. If the results of the cognitive walkthrough narrows the eld signi-
cantly, user studies are an appropriate follow-up for detailed examination of the most
challenging set of tasks within one or two solutions. Thus while our result can be
considered a rst-pass at the problem, we felt the richness of the result merits sole
presentation.
3.5.2 Evaluated Clients
Real-world evaluation of the general approaches detailed in Section 3.3 is dicult.
Thus, we select six distinct Bitcoin clients or utilities that implement the key man-
agement approaches described. For the purposes of our usability evaluation, each
client was evaluated in its default conguration on OS X unless otherwise stated.
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Keys in Local Storage. The reference Bitcoin client, Bitcoin Core [Bit], is a
cross-platform client that stores keys locally (optionally encrypted with a password).
Bitcoin Core is the rst recommended client on the Bitcoin.org website.
Password-protected (Encrypted) Wallet. We use the MultiBit [Mul] client (also
recommended on Bitcoin.org) since it provides a more convenient way to encrypt
with a user-chosen password.
Oine Storage. We use paper wallets as oine storage. While paper wallets can
be as simple as printing private keys on to paper, we select the paper wallet creation
website Bitaddress.org [Poi]. Bitaddress allows users to generate new randomized
keys in their web browsers, and then print QR encoded keys.
Air-gapped Storage. We select the Bitcoin Armory [Arm] client which includes
functionality for creating an oine wallet that can be used to sign and export trans-
actions.
Password-derived Keys. One of the simplest ways to create a password-derived
key is on the Brainwallet [bra] website. The site allows users to enter a passphrase
which is converted into a private key.
Hosted Wallets. We use Blockchain.info [Blo] as our hosted wallet provider. As
of writing, Blockchain.info advertises the management of over 2.5 million user wallets.
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3.6 Results
The following is the full details of our walkthroughs, which expands on the shorter
version presented in the conference version of this paper.
3.6.1 Keys in Local Storage (Bitcoin Core)
We begin with an evaluation of Bitcoin Core, the original Bitcoin wallet client, which
uses locally-stored keys. We assume the user has downloaded and installed the Bitcoin
Core client (it has a straight forward wizard installation procedure).
T1: Congure. Bitcoin Core transparently generates a new set of addresses on
rst run, but shows no notication to the user that this has occurred (fails G3). The
receiving address can be found under the Receive coins tab, but this could be easily
confused with the Addresses tab which contains a contact list of other user addresses
(fails G2).
To retrieve the account balance, Bitcoin Core must be online and the user must
wait until a full copy of the blockchain has been downloaded. Except for a small
status indicator on the bottom-right side of the window that shows a small red cross
in-between two black windows, there are no other messages to show the user that the
application should be online. Due to the size of the blockchain, this may take hours
to days to complete. A status bar displaying \Synchronizing with network" shows the
progress of the blockchain download (achieves G8), but the terminology may be too
technical for novice users, With a mouse over the icon, it says `0 active connections
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to Bitcoin network' which is likely unfamiliar language that does not help resolve the
error (fails G4 and G6). Once the blockchain has been downloaded, the balance is
displayed on the Overview tab (achieves G3).
T2: Spend. Spending Bitcoin is straightforward since the keys are readily avail-
able to the Bitcoin Core client. Users spend Bitcoin by navigating to the Spend tab
(achieves G1 and G2). Since our focus is on key management, we do not evaluate the
actual completion of transactions (which may have additional usability issues). We
focus on ensuring the key is available to the software tool (which is not so straight-
forward with e.g., oine storage).
T3: Spend from Secondary Device. Installing Bitcoin Core on a secondary
device creates a new set of keys. Users may not understand that the keys must be
copied to the secondary device (fails G1), and if so, what le must be copied (fails
G2). The correct procedure is to back up the wallet.dat with the `backup wallet...'
option in the `File' tab of the rst installation and chose a directory to save the
wallet.dat. Next the user must securely transfer this le to the secondary device,
and no guidance is provided on how to do this (fails G2) or the dangers of transferring
it through an insecure mechanism (fails G5).
Assuming the user has transferred wallet.dat to the secondary device, she could
try looking for import options in the newly installed wallet client, or drag and drop
the wallet.dat into the client, but she would fail to do so as no import option exists.
The documentation is inadequate here as well|there is actually nothing in the help
menu except a debug window that is for advance user to tweak the application (fails
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G2 and G6)!
The only mechanism to activate the wallet on a secondary le is to actually over-
write wallet.dat on the secondary device with wallet.dat from the rst. It is
unlikely any novice user would be able to complete this step. It is actually even
dicult to nd the path to copy wallet.dat to on the new device|this could be
possible by searching the local le system for wallet.dat, which might not suc-
ceed due to non-searchable system reserved folders or not knowing the exact le
name (spotlight does not return any result for wallet.dat). More likely, the user
will search online.14 On OS X, the path is /Users/User/Library/Application
Support/Bitcoin/wallet.dat.
The next step is to replace the new wallet.dat with the one from the primary
device. It should be noted that the name of the le should be exactly wallet.dat
for the Bitcoin Core to be able to read the le. Some of errors that the user might
encounter during this procedure are:
 The user might copy wallet.dat from the primary device wallet client path
instead of the one exported through the back up option. This could cause a
corrupted wallet.dat that is not readable by the secondary device's Bitcoin
Core. This is due to Bitcoin Core's procedure to lock wallet.dat while it is in
use. The error is recoverable by repeating the process correctly (fails G4).
 User should wait for the Bitcoin Core on the secondary device, to download and
14https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Data_directory
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sync the Blockchain from the P2P network to be able to authorize a transaction.
 On the secondary device, the nal balance might be wrong and there would be
the need to resynchronize and rescan the blockchain to have the correct nal
balance (fails G3).
Finally, this process must be repeated if either client exhausts their keypool. If
both do, there is no way to merge the new keys in the keypool, and replacing one
wallet.dat with the other will lead to unrecoverable funds (fails G5).
We note that replacing the key le may require a re-scan of the blockchain to
display the correct balance (fails G3).
T4: Recovery. If only one device is used, there is no way to recover from loss of
the key le (e.g., due to a disk failure, le corruption, or loss of the device itself;
fails G5). If the user backed-up the key le, the process for recovering from loss is
equivalent to that of T3 above.
3.6.2 Password-protected Wallets (MultiBit)
Although it is possible to encrypt the wallet.dat with a password in Bitcoin Core,
it is not the default option nor is there any cue to do so. Instead we evaluate the
MultiBit client, where one of the recommended rst steps is to password protect the
wallet le. MultiBit is a popular client in particular for its use of SPV15 for lightweight
blockchain validation that can complete within minutes instead of, relative to Bitcoin
15Simplied Payment Verication [Nak08]
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Core, days.
T1: Congure. On rst run, a welcome page contains an explanation of common
tasks that can be performed with MultiBit|where the send, request and transaction
tabs are and how to password protect the wallet le (achieves G1 and G2). The client
provides help options for other functionalities with direct and non-technical guides
(achieves G6).
MultiBit automatically generates a new receiving address on rst run, but does not
notify the user (fails G3). Reading the newly generated address requires navigation
to the Request tab, which displays \Your address" as well as a copy of the QR code
of address.(partially achieves G2).
The interface shows the status of the program (online, oine, or out of sync) on
the bottom left status bar, the balance of the user's wallet on the upper left, and the
latest price of Bitcoin on the upper right of the window (achieves G8). The interface
seems to minimize jargon and technical vocabulary (achieves G6). As it is mentioned
on the welcome page of the application, every option in MultiBit has the ability to
show help tips by hovering the mouse over that option (achieves G6 and G7).
The displayed balance is not necessarily current until synchronization is com-
pleted, however there is no direct cue in the balance area indicating this (achieves
G8).
T2: Spend. The user must navigate to the tab labeled Send, as instructed on the
welcome screen (achieves G1 and G2). If the client is not synced, the send button
is disabled (achieves G4). If it is synced, the user lls out the transaction details,
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destination address and amount and clicks send. The client prompts the user for the
decryption password (achieves G2). An incorrect password displays the error `The
wallet password is incorrect' but otherwise allows immediate and unlimited additional
attempts. Entering the correct password authorizes the transaction (achieves G3).
T3: Spend from Secondary Device. On the primary device, the user must
navigate to the Options menu, and select Export private keys under tools (fails G1
and G2). The interface displays a wizard requesting an export password as well as
a le system path for the exported le to be saved. If the user attempts to save
the exported le without password, a warning is displayed in red: `Anyone who can
read your export le can spend your Bitcoin' (achieves G5). By having a password-
protected le exported, the user can securely copy the le to the secondary device
with some protection against interception. After clicking to export, wallet le is saved
in the given path and the client checks that the le is readable (achieves G4 and G5).
On the secondary device, the user must select Import private keys from the Op-
tions menu. After selecting the previously exported le, the wizard conrms the
completion of the import (achieves G4) and the balance is updated to reect the
newly imported keys. The user can proceed to create a new transaction as in T2.
MultiBit sends change to the originating address, so keypool churn is not an issue.
T4: Recovery.. As with Bitcoin Core, recovery is not possible if no backup of the
wallet le was made. Creating a backup and importing it follows the same procedure
as T3. As expected, both the password and the backed up wallet are necessary for
recovery.
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3.6.3 Air-gapped Key Storage (Armory)
Bitcoin Armory is an advanced Bitcoin wallet that allows the wallet to be stored
and managed on an oine device, while supporting the execution of a transaction
through an online device. Armory is also used on the online device to obtain the
blockchain and broadcast the transaction created on the oine device. It is possible
to use some other online application to implement the airgap, however this is the
recommend method and the one we will consider.
T1: Congure. The user begins by installing Bitcoin Armory on the oine com-
puter. On the start, the welcome page oers the option to `Import Existing Wal-
let' and `Create Your First Wallet!' (achieves G2). The user creates her wallet,
with passphrase-protection being a mandatory option. Armory asks to verify the
passphrase and warns the user not to forget her passphrase (achieves G5). After this
step, a backup window pops up with the options to print a paper wallet or save a
digital backup of the wallet, and also warns the user if he decides not to backup his
wallet (achieves G5). After proceeding, the user must click on `Receive Bitcoins' to
prompt the client to generate the Bitcoin address in the wallet le (fails G3,G4). By
contrast, most clients do this step automatically on launch.
In order to see the balance of the account, the device must be online and synced
(fails G2). Thus the user must use the online device, not the oine device, to
check her balance. Users can click on the `Oine Transaction' button, which oers
a short documentation of the steps to be taken to sign a transaction and in doing
49
so, explains the oine/online distinction relevant to checking a balance. Within the
`Wallet' window, there is an option to `Create Watching-Only Copy.' The language
is dicult (fails G6): this option allows a copy of only the Bitcoin addresses to be
exported, not the private keys, for use on the online computer to display an updated
balance for each address. The exported le can be copied to the online computer.
We assume the user has installed Armory on the online computer. It should be
noted that Armory only works side-by-side with Bitcoin Core and uses Bitcoin Core to
synchronize and read the downloaded blockchain (fails G1). A pop-up window will
alert the user when `the blockchain' has been downloaded (partially achieves G3).
Armory displays a `Connected' cue in green in the bottom-right when it connects
to Bitcoin Core. Upon launching Armory, the user should click on `Import Existing
Wallet' and she is prompted to import either a digital backup or watch-only wallet.
She should chose the watch-only back up le that has been copied from the oine
computer. After the application is done syncing, the balance is displayed on the main
window under `available wallets' (achieves G8).
T2 & T3: Spend. With an air gap, the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary devices is less clear given that the basic setup itself includes two devices: one
online and one oine, but authorization of transactions uses the oine device. To
authorize a transaction, the user may begin from Armory on the online or oine
device (may not fully achieve G2). On the either device, the user should click on
`Oine Transactions' in the main window which displays a very detailed description
of the steps involved (achieves G1, G2, and G6). On the online computer, the user
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clicks the option: Create New Oine Transaction. The user will be asked to enter
the transaction details to generate an unsigned transaction as a le. The user must
transfer this le to the oine computer. As mentioned in this step's documentation,
the unsigned transaction data has no private data (the exact data will ultimately
be added to the public blockchain) and no harm can be done by an attacker who
captures this le (achieves G5) other than learning the transaction is being prepared.
On the oine computer, the user clicks on Oine Transactions and then Sign
Oine Transaction which prompts the user for the unsigned transaction data le.
Armory asks the user to review all the transaction information, such as the amount
and the receiving addresses (achieves G5). By clicking on the sign button signed
transaction data can be saved to a le. Text at the top of the window describes the
current state of the le (signed) and what must be done (move to online device) to
complete the transaction (achieves G1 and G2).
The signed le should be transferred to the online computer and be loaded through
the same oine transaction window. When a signed transaction is detected, the
Broadcast button becomes clickable. By clicking on broadcast, the user can once
more review transaction details, and receive conrmation that the Bitcoins have been
sent (achieves G3 and G8).
T4: Recovery. Like Bitcoin Core and MultiBit, Armory requires a backup of the
wallet to have been made. Without this backup, recovery is impossible. Armory
encourages backups at many stages (achieves G1 and G2). Armory provides many
prompts for the user to back up her wallet keys. At the time of creating the wallet,
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there are multiple windows and alerts conveying the importance of a back up, with
options for digital and paper copies. Even if user decides not to back up her wallet at
this stage, she is provided a persistent `Backup This Wallet' option (achieves G4). In
the backup window, there are a number of options to back up: a digital copy, paper
copy, and others. By clicking on the `Make Paper Backup' for example, the paper
backup is shown to the user containing a root key that consist of 18 sets of 4-characters
words and a QR code. To restore the paper wallet backup, on the main page, the user
can click on `Import or Restore Wallet' and select `Single-sheet Backup' option. She
will be prompted to input the Root Key from the paper wallet. The `Digital Backup'
option provides an unencrypted version of the wallet le that can be securely stored
on portable media. Recovering from a lost wallet with a digital backup involves
selecting `Import Digital Backup or watch-only wallet' from the `Import or Restore
Wallet' window as explained in core task 1. Armory also enables the user to test the
backups to ensure there is no error in the backup le (achieves G5) through the same
import procedure.
3.6.4 Oine Storage (Bitaddress)
There are dierent methods to use for oine storage of a Bitcoin wallet. For our
evaluation, we consider the use of a paper wallet. Specically we use the Bitaddress
web-service, a popular Bitcoin paper wallet generator. Many paper wallet generators
exist, however Bitaddress, at the time of writing, is the rst search result for `Bitcoin
paper wallet' on Google.
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T1: Congure. Upon visiting the bitaddress.org, the user is asked to move the
mouse or enter random characters in a text box to generate a high-entropy random
seed to be used to generate a private key associated with the Bitcoin address (achieves
G1 and G2). Once enough entropy has been collected, the site redirects the user
to a page that shows the receiving Bitcoin address and it's associated private key
(achieves G3). The public key (Bitcoin address) is labeled Share in green text and the
private key Secret in red (helping achieve G5). In general Bitaddress uses non-expert
terminology and simple instructions (achieves G6). To ensure the web service does
not retain a copy of the users' key (the generation is done client-side in Javascript),
the user should complete the process oine.
After printing, the user has a Bitcoin receiving address and, as mentioned in the
documentation, the balance can be checked through a Bitcoin Block Explorer16, such
as blockchain.info. The user uses this site to search for her Bitcoin address and
checks her balance. Although it is documented that the private key must remain
secret, a user may inadvertently expose the private key by placing the paper wallet
where it can be observed or by searching the website for the private key instead of
the public key.
T2 & T3: Spend. Since the keys are printed on paper, there is no dierence
between authorizing from a primary or secondary device so we collapse the analysis
of core tasks 2 and 3.
To send funds from a Bitcoin address that has been stored on a paper wallet, as
16webservice that provides access to the blockchain
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it is mentioned in the documentation, the user has to import her private key in one
of the wallet clients available, such as Armory or the Blockchain.info hosted wallet
discussed below. If the user inputs the private key address into a client that returns
change to newly generated addresses, she must export these new addresses to a new
paper wallet or she will lose the surplus when she removes the wallet from the client
(fails G5). If the user fails to remove the wallet from the client, a second copy is
maintained increasing her exposure to theft (but reducing her exposure to key loss).
The process to import a key from a paper wallet depends on the client. For
Blockchain.info, after making an online account, the user navigates to the `Im-
port/Export' tab and uses the option `Import Using Paper Wallet, Use your Webcam
to scan a QR code from a paper wallet.' It is also possible to type in the private
key in the `Import Private Key' text eld. After this step, the address now is hosted
on the online wallet and is the same as core task 2 in the Hosted Wallet section
(Section 3.6.6) below.
T4: Recovery. Loss of a paper wallet makes the funds unrecoverable (fails G5).
Bitaddress prompts the user to acknowledge this fact (also mentioned in its short
documentation) when creating a paper wallet (achieves G1).
3.6.5 Password-Derived Keys (Brainwallet)
The most popular and complete implementation of a deterministic wallet with password-
derived keys, at the time of writing, is Brainwallet.
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T1: Congure. The Brainwallet website displays by default a pre-generated address
corresponding to an empty passphrase. The passphrase input eld displays \Long
original sentence that does not appear in any song or literature. Never use empty
passphrase. (SHA256)", but there is no corresponding documentation explaining the
purpose of the passphrase or how it relates to the generated key (fails G1, G2, G6).
As characters are typed, a new key is generated. User may not notice that generation
of keys is happening dynamically, possibly preventing the user from noticing that the
task is complete (fails G3). The user should replace the default passphrase with her
own, hopefully ensuring her passphrase is not a commonly used phrase or anything
that could be brute forced by an oine dictionary attack17 as this passphrase is
sucient to access the funds stored in the resulting Bitcoin address. On entering the
desired passphrase, the public and private keys are displayed on the same page.
Once the address has been generated, retrieving the balance of that address re-
quires the use of an external service, but no suggestions are provided on the site (fails
G1 and G2). The interface does display a number of other elds (e.g., additional
encodings of the public key) which may not be meaningful to novice users (fails G6
and G7).
T2 & T3: Spend. Spending Bitcoins from a password-derived wallet requires the
user to import the private key into another client. The user should experience similar
usability challenges as those detailed in the Oine Storage client above.
T4: Recovery. Forgetting the password of a password-derived key leads to funds
17\Bitcoin Brainwallets and why they are a bad idea", Insecurety Research (blog), 3/26/2013.
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becoming unrecoverable (fails G5). Users will typically return to the same website
(i.e., the Brainwallet website) to extract private keys, but this may not be possible
if the site is inaccessible (fails G5).
3.6.6 Hosted Wallets (Blockchain.info)
A variety of online services oer online hosted wallet clients to users. We use the
popular Blockchain.info webservice for our evaluation.
T1: Congure. The user navigates to the Blockchain.info site and creates a new
wallet by providing an email address and a (min) 10 character password (achieves
G1 and G2). A message warning the user about the importance of not forgetting
the password is displayed during registration (achieves G5). Next, a Wallet Recovery
Mnemonic is shown to the user as a backup in case the password is forgotten. The
balance and address are immediately displayed (achieves G3).
T2 & T3: Spend. Hosted wallets are accessible from any web browser, so creating
transactions from many devices is straightforward. The user logs in to the site, clicks
Send money (achieves G1 and G2). After lling in the required elds, the user is
informed that the Bitcoins have been sent (achieves G3). Some of Blockchain.info's
error messages may be too technical for novice users. For example, No free outputs to
spend is displayed when transactions are created without sucient funds (fails G6).
T4: Recovery. To recover from a forgotten password, a wallet recovery mnemonic
may be provided on the login page. By clicking the Recover Wallet button, the site
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will ask for the mnemonic phrase and the email address send the new credentials
(achieves G1 and G2). Another recovery option is to proactively make backups and
import them in case recovery is needed. To do so, in the main wallet page, user has
to click Import/Export and exporting either an encrypted or unencrypted backup.
Unencrypted backups should be kept in a secure storage. There are dierent options
for the unencrypted backup procedure that could confuse the user and might result in
an unrecoverable backup (fails G5 and G6)|the back up is shown on a text eld that
the user has to copy and paste into a text le to be able to save it on her computer
(fails G2, G3 and G7). To restore the backups, there is an `Import Wallet' option.
3.7 Discussion18
3.7.1 Metaphors
Bitcoin naturally invites a metaphor to traditional currency. This metaphor is often
used in the clients (e.g., send coins, receive coins, wallet), but does not always support
their usability. The coin metaphor fails in both of the ways that user interface
metaphors traditionally fail [CKM87]: aspects of Bitcoin transactions do not easily
t the coin metaphor, and conversely, encourages users to overextend the metaphor.
Both of these lead to confusion on the part of users.
One way in which the metaphor of physical coins fails is in the sending and
receiving of Bitcoin. In the physical world, the same physical token is almost always
18This section is largely the work of the co-authors of the paper but is included for completeness.
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used to represent the same unit of currency (i.e., giving money to a friend involves
handing them the coin). However, when Bitcoins are exchanged, the private key
is not transferred along with the balance. Private keys remain in possession of the
sender, and can be reused and associated with new coins at a later time.
Many of the evaluated clients use the word \Send" to describe authorizing (dig-
itally signing) a transaction, and private keys are not mentioned in any of the eval-
uated clients at the moment of transaction. It may appear counter-intuitive that
this is a bad thing, but never mentioning the existence of keys may cause further
confusion. The password-protected wallets, (e.g., Multibit) require the user to input
their password, but do not clarify the reason for the password.
Addresses are another metaphor that relate to the issue of transacting. The
evaluated clients use the word \Address" to refer to the public key associated with a
private key held by some user. This seems to be a relatively successful metaphor: it
emphasizes the public nature of the public key, and also divorces the user's perception
of a relationship between the public and private keys. To momentarily extend the
metaphor, a user is accustomed to the idea that they will need to share their address
in order to receive an item. However, the private key is more akin to the key to their
mailbox, and a user would never think that they should share their mailbox key in
order to receive mail to an address.
Another pervasive metaphor in the evaluated clients is the Bitcoin \wallet", where
the user's Bitcoins are stored. The wallet metaphor is deeply entrenched in the
foundations of Bitcoin. The reference client, Bitcoin Core, stores private keys in a
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le named wallet.dat and theMultiBit client invites users to \create your rst wallet!"
on rst launch. The hosted clients also use the metaphor; Blockchain.info prominently
shows a Wallet tab, under which users are invited to \Create My Free Wallet". The
wallet metaphor is descriptive for users, but fails to encompass the complexity of a
user's collection of keys. In reality, the Bitcoin wallet contains private keys, but the
term wallet is used to describe both the le storing the private keys, and the main
interface of Bitcoin clients (as in Blockchain.info). This main interface sometimes
includes a variety of other information, such as transaction history, address book,
currency exchange rates, etc.
3.7.2 Abstractions
Abstraction and automation are complex issues for security software. Often, security
is too complex to be completely automated, and the problem cases are often punted
to the user (e.g., in the case of TLS certicates [BvOP+09]).
On rst run, all of the evaluated clients transparently generate keypairs without
informing the user. This behaviour continues as new transactions are made, where
clients generate new addresses with no user notication (e.g., for receiving change).
It is unclear how well this abstraction works: while users do not need to be burdened
with the knowledge of each private key, there are still situations in which a user
might need to manage those keys, and the abstraction prevents users from doing so.
Recovery from key loss depends on the existence of an up-to-date backup. While
backup sounds like a simple task, in many of the evaluated clients, it involves nding
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the right menu (MultiBit), or the right le (Bitcoin Core). Some clients do prompt
the user to back up their wallets (e.g., Bitcoin Armory), but with the private keys so
completely abstracted away, users may not even understand what they are backing
up, or why. Key churn, and the consequent need for semi-regular backups complicate
the issue even farther.
The abstractions made in Bitcoin clients are sometimes benecial for users, such
as in the case of displaying a user's balance. A user's Bitcoin balance is typically
made up of many small amounts corresponding to many private keys. However, most
of the evaluated clients abstract these balances into a single gure. This highlights
a usability disadvantage of paper wallets { the user must manage these multiple
balances manually, and there is no method of seeing an aggregate balance when
multiple paper wallets are in use.




Figure 3.2: Screenshots of technical language displayed by two dierent clients.
When performing our evaluation, we identied multiple occurrences of highly
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specialized or technical language used in the Bitcoin clients. These instances of
technical language are confusing, particularly to novice users who are unlikely to be
aware of either the jargon, and for whom the language will not help clarify the issues.
The language itself highlights the complexity of the tasks associated with Bitcoin,
and the diculty of explaining them simply.
Examples of such language included messages in MultiBit and Bitcoin Core that
referenced the client being \out of sync" or \synchronizing with network" (see Fig-
ure 3.2a) referring the process of downloading a full copy of the blockchain or retriev-
ing relevant blocks from a trusted peer. A related message in MultiBit (Figure 3.2b)
and Armory displayed the number of blocks that had been downloaded, as well as
the number of connections to the Bitcoin network. These messages are intended to
communicate that clients may benet from faster transaction notications when con-
nected to more peers, but since peer connectivity is dicult for users to control, there
is little benet in communicating these ideas with the user. Similarly, the number of
blocks independently has little signicance to most tasks performed by an end user.
We suggest that not only could this language be claried, but that the interfaces
could also streamline the amount of information that is presented to the user on
every screen.
We also noticed that some clients used highly technical language when they could
have used the metaphor to provide a simpler explanation to users. When attempting
to authorize a new transaction on Blockchain.info with insucient funds, the web
interface displayed \no free outputs to spend". This error message is confusing, and
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would be more easily understood if it referred to the lack of coins instead of the lack
of outputs. Similarly, essential actions such as importing or exporting keys were often
buried behind advanced or debug menus.
In the evaluated clients, there were often few resources to which users could turn
for help. In the cognitive walkthroughs, the answer to the question \will the user
know what to do?" was almost always unclear. Interface cues and features such as
tool tips, wizards, or other contextual help were almost entirely lacking. Some actions
were guided (e.g., Multibit's prompted backups or create your rst wallet), but many
actions such as obtaining the balance of a paper or password-derived address were
unsupported by help or documentation.
3.8 Conclusion
Bitcoin's usability limitations, particularly those related to key management, pose
challenges to its rising popularity. In our evaluation, we found that developers in
the Bitcoin ecosystem are making innovative attempts at solving the decades-old
problem of usable key management. While some of these techniques seem promising,
we nd that tasks involving key management can be mired in complex metaphors
and confusing abstractions.
Further investigation is needed to better understand and address these issues. A
user study would give insight into exactly how these problems are aecting users and
it would be interesting to investigate how expert users are (apparently successfully)
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handling these challenges. Bitcoin presents a new opportunity for public key cryp-
tography to become mainstream, and our evaluation is a rst step towards achieving
usable key management in decentralized crypto-currencies.
We covered the major categories of Bitcoin Wallet clients in this chapter. In
the next chapter, we will try to evaluate each category for point of sale terminals
for a small business to accept Bitcoin payments. It should be mentioned that the
framework that was used in this chapter is specically tailored for evaluating Bitcoin
wallet clients and is not directly usable for other Bitcoin related software systems
including point of sale terminals.
63
Chapter 4
Bitcoin Point of Sale Terminals:
Evaluation and Deployment
4.1 Introductory Remarks
In previous chapter we evaluated the major categories of Bitcoin wallet clients for
the user. In this chapter we survey and evaluate the existing Bitcoin payments for a
business to accept Bitcoin. We use SCRAM [Sut03] requirement engineering method
to develop the most suitable Point of Sale (PoS) for a small business based on our
evaluation framework. We would use PoS for point of sale terminal through out
this chapter. Although we borrowed several concepts used in the previous chapter,
the problems of wallets and PoS are distinct enough to necessitate a new evaluation
framework specic to PoS.
One aspect of Bitcoin is that there is no specic entity backing up the currency,
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whoever that is using Bitcoin gives value to it. As a Bitcoin enthusiast one of the
goals is to have more places to accept Bitcoin, however this has been an issue for the
business owners to implement a simple, yet fully functional PoS to be able to accept
Bitcoin as a method of payment. This chapter discusses the approach we use to eval-
uate existing Bitcoin point of sales, our proposed approach, and the implementation
of Aunja PoS in a Cafe in Montreal1.
In order to do so, we started by eliciting the requirements of a payment system
for a small business, and then researched the available options to see if they meet
our requirements. Then, we put together a framework to compare these PoS with
dierent criteria in security, privacy, usability and deployability categories. In the
end, we implemented Aunja PoS for this small business that could be used in any
other similar businesses as the payment method to accept Bitcoin.
4.2 Requirments Engineering
Requirement engineering is the process of dening, documenting and maintaining
requirements and is a subeld of software and system engineering. The term was
rst used in 1979 [Alf79] and then became a general term with the publication of
an IEEE Computer Society tutorial [Dor90]. Requirements Engineering is the rst
phase in waterfall software development process [Roc70]. Depending on the type of
the system being developed, the methods dier.
1 Cafe Aunja http://aunja.com
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Probably the best way to analyze the requirements of a small business is to model
real world descriptions and stories in scenarios. Scenarios are examples of real world
experiences that we could use to model what is needed in the system. That is why
scenario-based requirements engineering method named SCRAM was chosen.
4.2.1 SCRAM
We used SCRAM (Scenario-based Requirements Analysis Method) as our framework
to gather the requirements of this system. SCRAM denes four phases of requirement
engineering and has been shown to be a great requirement engineering framework.
This method consists of four phases:
 Initial requirements capture and domain familiarisation: This is done
by interviewing and fact-nding methods to have a full understanding of how
the business works.
 Storyboarding and design visioning: This is done by making storyboards
and walkthroughs to show to the business and get feedback on feasibility.
 Requirement exploration: This uses the early prototypes and designs to
get critiques from the business and validate the requirements.
 Prototyping and requirement validation: This is done by developing
fully functional prototypes and continues rening the requirements until the
product is acceptable by the business.
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Figure 4.1: Role of scenarios and their relationship to requirements specications and
prototypes [Sut03]
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Phase 1: Initial requirements capture and domain familiarisation. We asked the
cafe owner, two employees and two customers for a scenario involving Bitcoin payment
in the cafe to create the common "normal use case". The dierences between the
scenarios were insignicant thus the exceptions to this normal use case are not valid.
One exception was power failure, and because even the current accepted payment
methods such as Visa would fail, it was not considered as a valid scenario, that being
said, there are methods to mitigate this that will be discussed later in the thesis such
as browser-based PoS.
As the cafe already have other payment systems in place, there is no need to go
through the cafe's business plan or any other specication to check for conicts. The
only change is to implement another payment system at cashier's desk (see gure
4.2). However, there are requirements in the PoS system that need to be met, such
as realtime Bitcoin to at money exchange and obvious alert of successful or failed
payments.
Phase 2: Storyboarding and design visioning. Based on the information gathered
from Phase 1 and further analysis, such as user survey on the design, storyboard was
developed, see gure 4.3.
Phase 3: Requirements exploration. We developed a proof of concept2 , capable
of doing a simple Bitcoin payment. The Bitcoin exchange rate and the amount of
transactions were hard coded and the transaction would be executed manually. We
asked the employees to run a mock purchase with the demonstrator to see how they
2concept demonstrator [Sut03]
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Figure 4.2: Phase 1 - Normal Use Case
Figure 4.3: Storyboard - User Interface rst sketch
69
would interact with the system and received feedback. As Bitcoin concepts might
be ambiguous for the new user, there should not be any interactions with Bitcoin
concepts and terminology. After the transaction was done, the owner pointed that
there is the need for a central logging system that could be checked from time to time
for the daily transactions.
Phase 4: Prototyping and requirements validation. We used the feedback gath-
ered from phase 3 to make the rst prototype. The prototype retrieved the Bitcoin
exchange rate in realtime and the employee only had to input the dollar amount in
the PoS. This made it possible to keep the Bitcoin terminology out of the scope of
the training for the employees. However on the rst prototype, to show the successful
payments, the system was showing the transaction on a Blockchain explorer3, using
web-based APIs. This was not clear for a novice user on what the state of the system
is. On the second round of prototyping, we designed an interface to show that the
transaction has been broadcasted to the Bitcoin network and would use that knowl-




We propose a framework specialized for Bitcoin point of sale systems to score the sys-
tem with a set of requirements based on usability, deployability, privacy and security.
These are not a nal set of requirements for a general purpose system, however in the
case of Bitcoin payments for a small business these will suce. It worths mentioning
that these requirements are a subset of Systems and Software Quality Requirements
known as ISO/IEC 25010:2011 [SQu].
We start by using our scenario based requirement engineering approach and
adding the required non-functional requirements (e.g., maintaining payee's privacy,
data encryption). These requirements will be used to score each system described in
this section, gathered in Table 4.1. For simplifying the gure, we use three score
indicators. () for a complete score on the requirement, () if the requirements has
not met completely and empty space if it is not satisfying the need. For some of the
requirements the scoring system might be confusing (e.g., low cost to run) which will
be explained later.
4.3.1 Usability
There are dierent aspects of usability that should be considered. One is how the
PoS is accessible for the employees and the other is technical matters of the imple-
mentation.
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 User Friendly: The payment process should not be technical or complex for a
cafe employee, a simple training for the employee would be enough for them to
be able to accept Bitcoin. Also there should be a clear, mutual understanding
when the payment is nalized. A PoS that has all of these features would score
(), having some would result in scoring ().
 Time-Ecient: the process of payment should not take signicant amount
of time more than the common payment systems such as Visa payments. If
the process takes the same time as credit card payments it would score (),
anything less than that would be () or none.
 Fair Exchange Rate: there should be a easy and fair approach for the payer
and payee to have a consensus on at currency to Bitcoin exchange rate. If the
price is retrieved from commonly accepted sources it would score ().
 Availability: all employees should be able to do the Bitcoin payment process
without the need to know any credentials. If it's on a public domain for anyone
to access it will score (), if it needs some private information it will score ()
and if it needs credentials it will score none.
4.3.2 Deployability
We use this category to state the requirements regarding the implementation of the
system and branching. In the case of small businesses, the ability to manage multiple
branch systems might not be a really important aspect. That being said, we will
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score the systems for future work and hence to have a more complete framework.
 Low Cost to Run: PoS should be implemented in a way that is accessible
with one of the currently owned devices of the cafe such as the cashier computer,
the PoS terminal4 or mobile devices. There should not be a need for buying
new hardware or expensive software. For this requirement, we would score a
() to a free of monetary cost system, and a () score to a moderate amount of
spendings.
 Enables Branching The ability to install the point of sale on multiple branches,
meaning the installation process for another branch of the business should not
require modication on the PoS. Conguration might be needed to dierentiate
two branches in the system. If the PoS is packaged and easy to install on the
second branch of the business it will score (), if needs some modication ()
and if it is the same procedure to install it as the rst one it will score none.
4.3.3 Privacy
Privacy is important in the payment system in the sense that no information should
be leaked from any of the payers nor payee to the other party. This should be one of
the fundamental requirements for any payment system.
 No Information leakage: There should not be any sensitive information
available to the customer when she wants to pay with Bitcoin. These informa-
4The common PoS that accepts Visa/Debit Cards
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tion could be the infrastructure of the business's network or a private domain
used for accounting purposes. If it leaks any sensitive information it will score
none and if it leaks some non-sensitive information it will score ().
 Maintains Payee's Privacy: The payer should not be able to see how much
the payee has received prior or after her payment but just her own amount of
payment. If there is no link between the payments visible to the payer the PoS
will score ().
 Maintains Payer's Privacy: The payee should not be able to see how much
the payer owns. This is one of the challenges that has not been fully solved
[AKR+13]. It is the payer's responsibility to manage her funds and addresses
in a sense that there is no privacy leak. All the PoS' in this evaluation scored
() as this is outside the scope of the payee's PoS. This property is included to
have a complete framework to evaluate future software.
 Condential Payments list: The ability to see the payments list, only avail-
able for the manager by an authentication method, such as a password-protected
panel. If the PoS oers a report page for the manager it will score (), if the
report page could have hierarchal authentication for employees with limited
access it will score ().
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4.3.4 Security
Security might not be the cafe owner's priority as he might not have a deep under-
standing of this concept in payment systems nor in Bitcoin sphere. Anyhow it is
one of the most important aspects in any nancial payment system and also usable
Bitcoin applications. Security of the system represents more than just the PoS code,
it includes the environment that PoS is being used, the people using the software and
the operating environment of the software [HLMN].
 No 3rd-Party Trust: There should be as little 3rd party trust as possible to
accept and hold Bitcoin. Full trust to a third party will result in scoring none,
some trust on the main functionality of the PoS result in () and no trust will
result in () score.
 Data Encryption: In the case of any attacks on the service, there should be
security measures that makes sure the attacker will not be able to have access to
the private keys and transfer Bitcoin. Only if all the sensitive data is encrypted
the PoS will score ().
 No Software Dependency: The system should use as little dependencies as
possible to minimize the attack vector on the server. This also falls into the
deployability category as more dependencies could lead to the need of having
a more complex system for implementation. If the PoS needs complex set of
software or hardware to work it will score none, and if it could be executed in
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a browser5 without the need to run any other software it will score ().
4.4 Evolution of PoS proposals
We will rst go through the available options and why we chose to develop a custom
PoS for this purpose.
There exist multiple payment systems which mostly suit the online markets (e.g.,
e-commerece) and not a physical point of sale 6. We list all the available approaches to
accept Bitcoin payments for a physical business, and not as an e-commerce business.
4.4.1 One Bitcoin address - QR Code
One of the suggested ways for small businesses to accept Bitcoin is to hold one Bit-
coin address and print out the QR code of that address near the cash register. In this
way, the customer could scan the QR code and input the dollar value on his Bitcoin
wallet and pay the business with the equivalent Bitcoins.
Usability It is not user friendly as it puts the employee in a position that she
needs to know how Bitcoin transactions work and she needs to prepare,receive and
check the payment manually (User friendly: none). This makes the time spent on the
payment longer than normal payment systems (Time-ecient: none) . Same goes for
5In order to use a software PoS a mobile device or a computer is needed and we assume a web
browser is by default installed on these devces
6https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/How_to_accept_Bitcoin,_for_small_businesses
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the fair exchange rate, She should come to an agreed exchange price with the customer
and this needs a deeper understanding of Bitcoin and nance (Fair exchange rate: ,
because the payee and payer should reach a consensus on the price). Thus technical
training is required for each employee responsible for handling Bitcoin payments. As
long as the QR-code print is visible to the payer, it is available to pay (availability:
).
Deployability The cost to implement this method is almost zero (Low cost to
run: ), in monetary and time value. However, as mentioned in usability section,
the time spent on each transaction fails for regular use. In case there are multiple
branches, more print outs suce to have multiple point of sales (Enables branching:
).
Privacy This method provides no privacy for the seller (Payee's privacy: none).
As all the Bitcoin transactions are publicly available in the Blockchain, anyone with
the knowledge of the receiving Bitcoin address could see all the received payments,
thus anyone could have access to the reporting page that is the payments received by
the printed address (Condential Payments list: none).
Security Other than the system holding the private key, not much security con-
cern is applicable to this approach (No 3rd-party trust: ). The private key should
be kept in a secure place, preferably a cold storage unless the funds should be trans-
ferred to another address (e.g., to exchange for cash). There are no software or data




There are multiple hardware terminals available for accepting Bitcoin, however due
to the high cost to run (e.g., Coinkite7 PoS are for sale at the starting price of
970USD), they have not been used in most of small businesses and have not been re-
viewed before. Also the fast changing technology made most of the terminal provider
companies move to mobile or web-based solutions.
Usability The interfaces of each of the provided terminals are dierent. The
most popular ones mimic the look and behaviour of a normal point of sale terminal
used by credit card companies. However adding a new device to the payment routine
would make it less user friendly and arises the need for training the employees (User
friendly: ). The time and availability of the payment through a hardware terminal
should be the same as credit card payments if not lower (Time-ecient: ) . The
customer, nor the payee has any control over the exchange rate and it is provided by
the PoS terminal operator (Fair exchange rate: ). The device is accessible to anyone
who has access to the other payment terminals (Availability: ).
Deployability Due to the high costs these devices have, they score low in our
framework (Low cost to run: none). Also in case there are multiple branches of the
business, there should be one devices bought for each branch this makes the costs
even higher (Enables branching: none).
Privacy Accepting Bitcoin with a hardware terminal should persevere the privacy
the same as the regular credit card terminals, however the payees privacy depends
7https://coinkite.com/store/products/all
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on the implementation of the Bitcoin payment system (Payee's privacy: ). The
terminal providers also oer similar interface to credit card terminals to list the
payments (Condential Payments list: ).
Security The payee has no control over his private keys nor holds the funds (No
3rd-party trust: none), thus he needs to trust the third-party company that provided
the terminals to keep the funds safe, and will receive the payments upon the agreed
time frame with probably small transaction fees. As for other aspects of security,
we assume the back-end implementation keeps the private keys encrypted and secure
(Data encryption: ). There are security risks involved in adding new hardware or
software to the cashier's computer that will fall out of the scope of this chapter (No
software dependency: none).
4.4.3 Online Merchant Services
Most of these services are focused for online businesses and don't have any implicit
implementation for a physical payment system. One of the most famous ones, on
the time of writing, is Bitpay8 that takes 0% fees unlike some others competing
companies, but they all have their own advantages. One other similar company is
Coinbase9 that charges 1% on exchanging Bitcoins to at currency.
Usability Implementing a Bitpay payment is straightforward and easy to imple-




). They have their own exchange rate (Fair exchange rate: ) that the business owner
could set to exchange to cash as soon as he receives payments, this will remove the
possible eect that Bitcoin price volatility could have on the payments. It requires
some credentials to access the PoS page (Availability: ).
Deployability The only thing required by this approach is a smart phone or a
small computer that users could interact with and browse to the Bitpay payment
page, preferably with a touchscreen for easier price input and user interaction, as the
interface is designed for touchscreen devices (Low cost to run: ). It is easy to add
more branches to the original account or even make a new account for the second
branch (Enables branching: ).
Privacy Bitpay another approach for preserving the privacy. As they generate
a new address for each transaction, the payee's privacy is safe(Payee's privacy: ).
However there has been reports of account suspensions because the payments were
coming from agged Bitcoin addresses (e.g., black markets10 or LocalBitcoins 11),
meaning that there was malicious activities on that Bitcoin address such as money
laundry or buying drugs from online site. In this case, the privacy, as the sense that
we are evaluating, is being held but maybe not in he aspects needed in a payment
system. In order to view the payments, business owner should log in to his account
and view the payments but other employees cannot see the list using any other
accounts (Condential Payments list: )
10Darknet Blackmarketshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet_market
11Peer to peer Bitcoin trading site http://localBitcoins.com
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Security Every aspect of the payment system is implemented by Bitpay, they
oered one of the most secure payment systems so far and there has been no big
hacks reported (Data encryption: ) . However, user has no control over his private
keys and all the keys are being stored on Bitpay servers (No 3rd-party trust: none)
which means complete trust to a third party. As they are a web-based solution, a
device with a browser is enough to use their PoS (No software dependency: )
4.4.4 Self Hosting PoS
Another option is to run a customized wallet as the point of sale service. There are
multiple options for this case and it depends on the features needed for managing the
Bitcoin addresses. It is still possible to use a 3rd party for some of the functionalities
like address generation or PoS interface. For the sake of simplicity we cover two
popular methods, one using Mycelium Gear and another is a full custom self-hosting
wallet using available open source software.
4.4.5 Mycelium Gear
Mycelium Gear 12 is a service oered by "Mycelium" group that oers a widget as
an interface to the user and a service that would use the BIP32 public key provided
on the Admin panel to generate new addresses securely. This means that they don't
hold any private keys, but still uses the same set of paths for address generation as
their Mycelium Mobile wallet uses.
12https://gear.mycelium.com/
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Figure 4.4: Mycelium Gear Widget
UsabilityMycelium Gear is designed in a way to suit e-commerce business needs.
It should be customized to suit a physical business PoS (User friendly: ) . There
are no fees related to using this service, the only usability issue is that the BIP32
path13 that is generated by the PoS widget, sometimes is dierent with the ones being
checked by the mobile wallet client, so there might be some payments missing from
the available credits in the application that is actually hard to retrieve if the path is
unknown. They oer fast verications on 0-conrmation transactions (Time-ecient:
) and it's possible to chose from a list of supported exchanges to retrieve the Bitcoin
exchange rate from (Fair exchange rate: ). A unique URL is needed to access the
payment page and the employees should be aware of this link (Availability: ).
Deployability This method would be simple to implement but somehow more
complicated to customize as there's not that much access to the code to be able to
customize for business needs. Although the cost-to-run depending on the implemen-
tation could be almost zero (Low cost to run: ). The only deployability downside is
that the payee is forced to use Mycelium Mobile wallet to manage his payments, how-
13see 2.2.1
82
ever doing so makes it easy to use the PoS in other branches and dedicate dierent
accounts to each branch (Enables branching: ).
Privacy As Mycelium Gear uses BIP32 to generate a new address for each trans-
action request the payees privacy is held (Payee's privacy: ). However, there is no
user management for the report page, If the customer closes the successful payment
page, the employee would not be able to check if the payment was received or not
unless he has the administrator password to check the transaction list (Condential
Payments list: ).
Security Nothing related to the PoS holds any private information or keys that
might be in danger of getting hacked, so there's no trust in any 3rd party in this
sense. Although all the private keys would be in the Mycelium mobile wallet that
is not prone to mobile malwares or hardware failure (No 3rd-party trust: ,Data
Encryption: ) . Also this would be the weak point that if the hacker steals the
phone, he has full access to all the available funds and also the future payments
if stay unnoticed. The only software dependency is that the user is forced to use
Mycelium mobile wallet (No software dependency: )
4.4.6 Aunja PoS
Depending on the requirements, it's possible to use integration of some open source
software to build a fully custom self-managed Bitcoin PoS. The details of this custom
PoS will be discussed in Section 4.5 and the scoring is discussed in Section 4.5.1.
Usability: As this is a fully customized PoS we could use the scenario based re-
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quirement engineering method to implement a system that meets the business needs.
Deployability: cost-to-run this system depends on the requirements and how
it is implemented. There might be some time needed to implement the prototype
and change the bugs on the next round of requirement engineering when we get the
feedback of the business owner and employees.
Privacy: We could implement the system with all the privacy measurements that
need to be satisfy for the business owner. New address generation for each transaction
would be basic need to have a good private PoS.
Security: Same as Privacy, it is possible to keep in mind all the security features
when implementing this system. One of the basic needs is that the private keys
should not be easily accessible, either kept oine or encrypted if they are stored on
the online server and also there should not be any trust in any 3rd party as it is
not needed on such a system. Although it should be mentioned that anytime that a
third party code is being executed, we are basically trusting the developer for that
software. However, in this case all the code used is open source and reviewed.
4.4.7 Desicion result
As you can see in table 4.1 there is no perfect solution out of the box for a small busi-
ness to start accepting Bitcoin. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of each method with the business owner, we decided to implement our own custom
PoS using available open source software. This way it would be easy to incrementally
change the PoS system with the customer and employees feedback to meet the needs
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of the business.
4.5 Design and Implementation
There are multiple approaches for implementing Aunja PoS. We rst have to see
what programming language we want to use and under which environment. One of
the lower cost methods would be to use a computer on the cafe's network as the
web server but the maintenance and support would be really hard as the network
might go down, or overwhelmed by the high number of connected devices and would
not function properly. Uptime is one of the most important aspects for a payment
system. The next low cost solution is to use shared hosting to host the wallet server
and design a web based payment interface for the employees and also a reporting
page for the business owner to track the Bitcoin payments. This made our decision
easier to chose a programming language, the most common programming language
supported by most shared hostings is PHP14.
PHP is a server-side scripting language designed for web development and can be
mixed with HTML to have more tools for interface design. It can be used with
MySQL15 as the database backend.


























































































































































































































































































































After multiple rounds of surveying employees and customers to understand their
needs and also researching the subject, here is the break down of the results.
Usability
 User Friendly (): The interface should be minimal and simple, with the
ability to show the exchange price of Bitcoin to at currency, input box for
the price in dollars, estimation of Bitcoin amount equivalent to the price and a
note section to jot down the details of the transaction. As for the user facing
interface, it should be simple, showing all the required information such as
Bitcoin amount, the exchange rate and the QRCode for the deposit Bitcoin
address. Both interfaces should indicate when the transaction is complete.
 Time-Ecient (): It should not take more than normal payment system
to initiate the payment. A web based interface would have the advantage that
it can be loaded from any device with good speed, depending on the Internet
speed. Also to verify the payment it should not take a long time. It also need
to use fast verication methods to indicate that the payment is propagated
(broadcasted to the Bitcoin network). Knowing that a propagated transaction
is not same as conrmed transaction but is an accepted risk for low volume
transactions.
 Fair Exchange Rate (): After doing our research on this we found the web-
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site called Bitcoinaverage16 that oers a good combination of all the exchange
prices to come up with an average daily price to be used as the fair exchange
rate.
 Availability (): The payment interface should be open to public in the
sense that it could be loaded on any device.
Deployability
 Low Cost to Run (): The only costs associated with this implementation
would be the annual cost of the shared hosting that nowadays is less than 100
dollars for an unlimited web host. For the sake of this research, there would be
no other implementation and development costs.
 Enables Branching (): For now there's no plan to have more branches for
this business, but depending on the implementation, to have another branch it
would be as easy as running another instance of the application on the server.
Privacy
 No Information leakage: The payment interface does not reveal any infor-
mation about the backend nor the business' internal detail.
16"BitcoinAverage.com is the rst aggregated bitcon price index that was initially launched in
August 2013 with a goal to aggregate rates from all available Bitcoin exchanges around the world
and provide a weighted average Bitcoin price." https://Bitcoinaverage.com
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 Maintains Payee's Privacy (): There should be a new address generated
for each transaction request so no one can see how much the business have
received in Bitcoin prior or after each transaction.
 Maintains Payer's Privacy () : This would be the payers Bitcoin wallet
client responsibility and it would be out of the scope of this PoS system.
 Condential Payments list (): There should be a reporting and adminis-
tration interface designed, only accessible to the business owner or designated
personals.
Security
 No 3rd-Party Trust (): There should not be any sensitive usage of 3rd
parties in the system, it should work as a stand alone system.
 Data Encryption (): All the private keys should be encrypted and then
stored on the server.
 No Software dependency (): There should not be any software depen-
dency on the payment page for the business. The software dependencies on the
server side should all be included in the package as open source software. The
only piece of software required to use a PoS on a mobile device should be a web
browser and we don't consider this as a software dependency.
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4.5.2 Open source libraries and software applications
There are multiple approaches to implementing the PoS. After the requirement engi-
neering phase, we chose PHP as our main programming language to code this project.
This narrows down the options to a few open source projects. As we examined dif-
ferent PHP Bitcoin projects, we chose the following as the base of our PoS software:
Bitcoin libraries
 Bitcoin SCI: Bitcoin Shopping Card Interface
 PHP Elliptic Curve library17: Used as a dependency to Bitcoin SCI to
generate Bitcoin addresses.
 Bitcoin-prices18: Display Bitcoin prices in human-friendly manner in at
currency using Bitcoinaverage.com market data
After searching the Internet, we decided to use "Bitcoin SCI: process Bitcoin
transactions with PHP" as the software to use as our Bitcoin core. It is originally
designed to be integrated in e-commerce websites but it could be easily modied to
meet our needs.
Bitcoin SCI (Bitcoin Shopping Cart Interface 19): is a set of libraries and tools





Figure 4.5: Bitcoin SCI (Bitcoin Shopping Cart Interface)
This is not a complete project to process payments. The rst decision was to use
this package for building the prototype and then if we failed to modify the package
to meet out needs, use another approach, however we could make it suit the needs
and Bitcoin SCI was used in the end product.
A break down of the tools Bitcoin SCI gives us are as follow:
 Bitcoin Address generation: Bitcoin SCI uses PHP Elliptic Curve library
to generate new secure Bitcoin addresses (set of public and private keys)
 Private key encryption: using phpseclib library, all the private information
(Bitcoin private keys, transaction details) are stored encrypted




 Input Interface: even though this package was meant to be used as an
e-commerce payment system, it has the basic tools and methods to build the
price input page
However it lacks some other features that should be added:
 Database: In order to have management and report page, saving the trans-
action details into a database is a must.
 Fair Bitcoin Exchange rate: It uses a predened source to obtain the
exchange rate of Bitcoin and it's not possible to set dierent currencies as the
input
 User-Friendly interface: All the interfaces are poorly designed and need to
be modied to suit the PoS system.
 Report Page: We need a report page with authentication in place.
 Input Validation: Other than security perspective of input validation, this
is needed because of the way we want the PoS to work. It should alert the
employee if she has done something wrong before going to the next page and
adding a failed transaction to the database.
 Cash out option: As all the private keys are stored encrypted in the server,
we need a way to cash out the available Bitcoins and send them to another
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Bitcoin address. It's possible to retrieve the private keys of each Bitcoin address
separately from the tool, but it's not scalable to multiple weekly transactions.
Bitcoin-prices This library allows us to use Bitcoinaverage.com prices as our
main source of price conversion, and it gives nice tools for interface design, such as
the ability to switch between dierent currencies by just clicking on the price. This
allows us to reach a fair exchange rate that is also shown in dierent currencies in
case it was needed.
Encryption libraries
 phpseclib21: used for private key encryptions.
We used this library mainly because it was already included in the Bitcoin SCI
package as a dependency, but later on when we added the database functionality, we
needed a library for encryption purposes that they were all included in phpseclib.
Interface libraries
 Sweet Alert 22: A Beautiful replacement for javascript's "Alert",
This is a nice Javascript library that we used to make the interface more user-
friendly. Also in the case of data validation, we needed a simple and nice way to




xed. For this case Javascript is the best option in the sense that it could validate
the inputs on the browser before sending it to the server.
4.5.3 Prototyping
With the full knowledge of the requirements and a few sketches of the interface, we
started developing the PoS. Although the rst prototype was ready to launch within
a week, we did 3 prototypes in the month after that, each had bugs xed and features
added as we surveyed and obtained feedback from the employees on each round of
prototyping.
Here is a short description of the implemented functionalities:
PoS main functionalities
The PoS was hosted on a shared hosting service named Host Monster 23. They oer
low cost annual plans that oer PHP and MySQL which are the requirements that we
need. Then we started working with Bitcoin SCI to add the database functionality
and dened tables for transaction requests and payments on MySQL.
I designed three tables (rst prototype had two) for the purpose of this PoS. One
table is for the Bitcoin key pairs to be stored and will be used to decrypt and export
the private keys when required (see Figure 4.6). The other table holds the information
regarding each transaction (Figure 4.7), later on to prevent spam requests and test
cases from making the table unnecessary big, we designed a temporary transaction
23http://hostmonster.com
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table to hold the data of each transaction before the payment is validated. As soon
as the payment is agged as valid, the relevant data would be moved to the main
table and will be removed from the temporary table.
Figure 4.6: Structure for wifkeys table that holds the Bitcoin key pairs
Figure 4.7: Structure for transaction history table
Bitcoin SCI uses a le-based method to store the keys and transaction details, as
a backup method, we kept that in place and stored the le hash detail of each entity
for future references.
Other tasks were involved in integrating the above mentioned open source projects
into each other to have a complete solution package.
One of the features that were added on the second round of prototyping was the
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Figure 4.8: Aunja PoS - First View
ability to show the Bitcoin price in USD other than the default CAD, this was added
with the usage of Bitcoin-prices library. The other was to add the "Notes" eld to
be able to add invoice ID or the items that the customer bought. It was possible to
implement a drop down menu with all the cafe's menu options to be added to the list
but as we discussed this solution with the cafe owner, he mentioned that the items
in the menu might not stay the same during the year and also there might be price
changes, so that approach was not suitable for this business, although it might be a
good option for an e-commerce site.
96
Figure 4.9: Aunja PoS - Payment
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Private reporting page
One other aspect of the requirements was a reporting page, this was based on the
feedbacks from the cafe's owner and his preferences.
Figure 4.10: Report Page
One of the important elds added later to the report page was the "Sale Dollar
Amount". The reason was that Bitcoin price is really volatile compared to other
currencies and the cafe owner did not want to risk losing money by accepting Bitcoin.
As you can see in (Figure 4.12), the Sale Dollar amount is less than the Bitcoin
amount. In this period of time, the owner could have had more prot on the sales
because of the increase in Bitcoin prices, but this would be considered as a risk that
he did not want to take. So as an agreement, we decided to lock the price of each
sale on the sale time to be paid the same amount as if he was selling his products
with cash24, Thus on the second prototype of the report page, this eld was added for
accounting purposes. This is real-time exchange, However as an agreement, cashing
out the Bitcoins would happen in monthly basis or within a threshold (e.g., when
reached 100 dollars).
Another added feature was the ability to check each transaction on the blockchain.
24this method is actually one of the common methods recently used by Bitcoin payment processors.
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If the cafe owner clicks on any of the Bitcoin addresses related to each sale, he would
be redirected to a blockchain explorer site and he can see if the transaction went
through or not.
Figure 4.11: A canceled sale - this means that the request was made on the Aunja PoS
interface to generate an address, but the customer never sent the Bitcoins. Probably
a customer changed his mind and paid via another payment method
Another feature request was the ability to decrypt and export the private keys of
those addresses that has some balance. This has been done for the admin page that
is out of the scope of this chapter.
Aunja PoS has been made open source and available to public25 under GNU




Figure 4.12: A Complete Sale - This shows that 0.01833541 BTC (approximately 5.5
CAD on the time of sale) was deposited in the address generated by the Aunja PoS
4.5.4 Training
We tried to make the interface as simple as possible for the employees. There is no
jargon or technical requirements to use Aunja PoS, but some details specic to Bitcoin
transactions have to be taught to the employees to be able to recover from human
errors while a transaction is being processed. Other than in-person training that was
done with every employee, a manual was made (Figure 4.13) and was attached to the
cashier's counter for future reference by all cafe employees.
4.6 Real-world Deployment
Cafe Aunja started accepting Bitcoin with Aunja PoS on Oct 23, 2014, and was one
of the rst cafes in eastern Canada that accepts Bitcoin. During the rst month,
there was more than 10 Bitcoin payments and it has been working ever since.
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Figure 4.13: PoS - Step by step manual for Bitcoin payments101
4.6.1 Lessons learned
One of the missing features that should be implemented in such a system is a fast
verication method. In early Bitcoin PoS, for each payment, the customer needs
to wait 10 minutes in average for the transaction to be conrmed and included in
the blockchain. To remedy this, we solved this issue by agging the transactions as
successful as soon as the transaction is broadcasted to the Bitcoin network, also known
as, 0-conrmation transaction. This could work for a PoS in a cafe as the volume
of each transaction is small and it's not risky to take 0-conrmation transactions,
Another newly introduced method to overcome the conrmation time is by using the
Bitcoin Lightening Network [PD15] but the technical details on lightening network
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However this is still an open problem to remedy
the risk for higher value transactions and prevent double spend attacks [KAC12]
[BDE+13].
Bitcoin and Bitcoin transactions are still new concepts for most people. We
encountered a countless number of questions from customers to explain what Bitcoin
is and how it works and mostly they became more interested to know more about
Bitcoin when they observed a payment done with the Bitcoin PoS, mostly because
they would not reveal any personal information with each payment.
Another interesting lesson is the concept of locked price that is the price of Bitcoin
for each sale is locked to the exact exchange rate at the time of the transaction. This
means if the customer paid 0.01 Bitcoin for a coee that was 3 dollars in the time
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of the purchase, the business owner will be paid the exact same amount of 3 dollars
and it should not dier if the Bitcoin price has been increasing or decreasing from
the time of the purchase to the time he chooses to cash out the receiving Bitcoin.
This makes the acceptance of Bitcoin payments for the business risk-free.
Now to test the system on production, it was time for the rst coee, to the best
of our knowledge, in eastern Canada to be bought with Bitcoin (Figure 4.14).
Figure 4.14: Database details of the rst coee bought with Bitcoin in the cafe
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In this thesis, we summarized all the existing Bitcoin wallet clients and put together
a framework to evaluate the upcoming software. We concluded that there is no
perfect wallet client yet and we have a long way to go to have a perfect solution.
We also evaluate the Bitcoin point of sales that accepted Bitcoin and again there
was no perfect solution for a small business to easily accept Bitcoin. We developed
and deployed a custom point of sale for small businesses and published it as an open
source application that has already been used by a few more small businesses all over
the world.
These are small steps towards having a framework to evaluate Bitcoin software,
wallet clients and payment processors, but they are necessary rst steps.
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